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The law of trusts has spent the last twenty years rapidly shedding many
traditional requirements, forms, and restrictions which imposed liability on
negligent trustees, protected vulnerable beneficiaries, and prevented the use of
state trust law to avoid the claims of settlors' creditors, including their
spouses, children, and federal and state governments. This Article studies the
"stripping of the trust" so as to develop a new paradigm for identifying
proposed law reforms likely to reduce social welfare before they are enacted: 1
show that injurious proposals can be identified according to the legal
evolutionary script they followed. I propose an innovative bright-line rule:
reforms enacting into law legal and financial service providers' earlier opt-
outs from the existing default law, and reforms originating in inter-
jurisdictional contests over clients, invested funds, jobs, and tax revenue,
should be carefully scrutinized before enactment, with particular attention to
their likely distributive results. Such reform proposals tend, more than others,
to reduce overall social welfare while benefitting legal and financial service
providers and some of their privileged clients.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen traditional fields of law change rapidly. State
legislatures have been abolishing and replacing centuries-old rules. The
replacements are often designed to serve the interest of legal and financial
service providers in attracting clients, or that of states in attracting investment,
jobs, and revenue. Their overall distributive consequences often reduce social
welfare.
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The law of trusts is one field that has changed radically in recent decades.
For about twenty years, state legislatures have been eliminating traditional rules
of trust law designed to impose liability on negligent trustees,1 protect
vulnerable beneficiaries, 2 and prevent the use of state trust law to avoid the
claims of settlors' creditors, including their spouses, children, and federal and
state governments.3 Recent examples abound. Virginia law now includes an
"Asset Protection Trust" regime, effective since 2012.4 Under that regime, a
settlor may transfer assets to trustees for the settlor's own benefit, so that the
settlor's beneficial interest in the assets is not subject to seizure by many of his
or her creditors.5 The regime transfers wealth from creditors to beneficiaries of
asset protection trusts, who will be able to benefit from property unreachable by
many of their creditors. Other winners under the new regime are Virginia
residents and entities authorized to engage in trust business in Virginia: one or
the other must be appointed trustee in order for the settlor to enjoy the benefits
of asset protection. 6 Losers include both beneficiaries' creditors and borrowers
who are not beneficiaries of such trusts: the latter will bear the increased costs
of credit brought about by asset protection beneficiaries' bad debts. Ohio,
having recently enacted an Asset Protection Trust regime of its own, effective
March 27, 2013,7 also permits "perpetual trusts," which may last forever.8
Perpetual trusts owe their popularity to the possibility of transferring assets
worth up to the federal wealth transfer tax exemption on trust, where they may
appreciate. Such trusts then permit generations of beneficiaries to enjoy the
benefit of that appreciation, free of wealth transfer taxes. The tax savings
beneficiaries enjoy contribute to the federal deficit, making necessary either the
degradation of government services, the imposition of future taxes, or both.
Trustees, however, earn perpetual fees.9 The groups benefitted by such law
reforms (those using and those providing such trusts) are relatively small, while
the group harmed (everyone else) is much larger. It is almost certain, therefore,
that the reforms reduce overall social welfare.
The Virginia and Ohio reforms, and hundreds like them, are already on the
statute books. How can such welfare-reducing reforms be blocked before they
are enacted? As legislators often have insufficient time to carefully analyze each
I See infra Part II.E.
2 See infra Part II.F.
3 See infra Parts II.C-D.
4 See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-745.1-745.2 (2012).
5 See id. § 64.2-745.1.(D)E).
6 See id. § 64.2-745.2(A) (defining "qualified trustee" and "qualified self-
settled spendthrift trust," which must "at all times" contain "at least one qualified trustee"
for the Asset Protection regime to apply). See discussion of asset protection trusts infra Part
I.D, of their evolution infra Part III.B.2, and of their distributive results infra note 138 and
accompanying text.
7 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5816 (West 2013) (entitled "Ohio Legacy Trust Act").
8See id. § 2131.09(B).
9 See discussion of perpetual trusts infra Part II.C, of their evolution infra Part II1.B. 1,
and of their distributive results infra Part IV.A.
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proposal's distributive consequences before enactment, a bright-line rule
enabling quick and sure identification of welfare-reducing reforms would be of
high value. This Article proposes such a bright-line rule: I argue that reforms
enacting into law legal and financial service providers' opt-outs from the
existing default law, and reforms originating in inter-jurisdictional contests over
clients, invested funds, jobs, and tax revenue, should be carefully scrutinized
before enactment, with particular attention to their likely distributive results.
Such reform proposals tend, more than others, to reduce overall social welfare
while benefitting legal and financial service providers and some of their
privileged clients.
Nowhere in the existing literature on legal evolution and law reform does
one find such a bright-line rule, distinguishing welfare-enhancing from welfare-
reducing reforms. Each of two relevant bodies of literature focuses on a single
script, or path, of legal evolution, characterizing it as likely to lead to either
positive or negative results. One is Professor Richard Posner's "positive theory
of the economic analysis of law," holding that legal evolution by way of the
accretion of judicial precedent tends to improve the law.10 Posner argued that
judge-made law evolves in an efficient direction as a result of judges either
attempting to provide efficient rules, or providing such rules without
consciously intending to change the law in an efficiency-enhancing direction."
Posner's theory has been a bone of scholarly contention for forty years, with
some scholars, including, recently, Judge Posner, arguing that judge-made law
is not particularly predictable or efficient. 12 The other relevant body of literature
10 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972).
11 See id §§ 1.2, 9.8.
12 See Anthony Niblett, Richard A. Posner & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of a Legal
Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 355 (2010) (concluding that "the hypothesis that, in
commercial fields, the common law is predictable and efficient, or at least is moving there, is
not supported by our study"). For earlier criticism of Posner's "positive theory" see, for
example, George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection ofEfficient Rules, 6
J. LEGAL STuD. 65, 66-67 (1977) (arguing that while the common law is indeed efficient, it
is not because judges attempt to fashion the law so as to maximize efficiency, but because
litigants are likelier to sue and refrain from settling in cases where the legal rules governing
the dispute are inefficient, so that such rules tend to be litigated and re-litigated until they are
brought into better accord with efficiency, while efficient rules would be re-litigated more
rarely and thus tend to remain part of the law); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 (1977) (same). But see Note, The Inefficient Common
Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862, 883-85 (1983) (arguing that the accumulation of precedent under a
common law system will systematically favor inefficient, rather than efficient, legal rules).
For scholarship in support of the theory see, for example, Robert C. Clark, The
Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1242-56 (1981) (reviewing
six instances of legal evolution in corporate and commercial law and arguing that in each
there was a general pattern of evolution toward cost reduction); John F. Duffy, Inventing
Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1, 5 (2007) ("The history of
the nonobviousness doctrine shows that in the very long run, considerations of economic
efficiency do put pressure on legal actors (not only on judges, but legislators, commentators,
attorneys, and other actors in the legal culture) to create, adopt, and justify economically
532 [Vol. 75:3
THE STRIPPING OF THE TRUST
focuses on jurisdictional contests. Such contests involve jurisdictions changing
their law so as to attract businesses and investment from out of state, create
demand for local products and services, and gather tax revenue. Jurisdictions
pursue these goals by offering rules of law they hope business owners,
managers, investors, and clients would find attractive. Legal changes made by
one jurisdiction often provoke reactions by others, sometimes snowballing into
a state-wide abandonment of traditional rules of law. Many such contests lead to
the reduction of regulatory demands, from the duties imposed on corporate
management, to employees' rights, to tax rates. 13 While some scholars identify
specific jurisdictional contests as having been made for improvement in the
law,14 most studies of such contests characterize them as "races to the bottom,"
efficient doctrines. However, the relevant time span within which those considerations can
operate is very long-on the order of several decades at least."); Thomas J. Miceli, Legal
Change: Selective Litigation, Judicial Bias, and Precedent, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 157, 159
(2009) (arguing that "judicial bias does not impede the evolution of the law toward
efficiency as long as the fraction of judges biased against efficiency is smaller than the
conditional probability that a case being litigated involves an inefficient law"); Giacomo A.
M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary
Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STuD. 379, 381 (2008) (concluding that "case law is a continuous,
never-ending process of evolution of legal rules that is characterized by probabilistic
convergence toward greater efficiency and predictability, which supports Posner's
hypothesis").
13 See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, The Three Parties in the Race to the
Bottom: Host Governments, Home Governments and Multinational Companies, 7 FLA. TAX
REV. 153, 154 (2005) (explaining that tax rates affect competition among countries for the
capital of multinational companies); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 677-78 (1974); Stephen F. Diamond, The
"Race to the Bottom" Returns: China's Challenge to the International Labor Movement, 10
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 39, 65-68 (2003) (arguing that international organizations
have undermined international labor unions by reducing international labor regulations); see
also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1603-11 (2000); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to
the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation
Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 923 (1982); Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition
in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the
Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1381, 1382 (2008); Christopher Paul, Innovation or a
Race to the Bottom? Trust "Modernization" in New Hampshire, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 353, 354
(2009); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining
Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 67, 68 (1996).
14 Studies identifying such "races to the top" include, for example, ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-24 (1993); Jonathan H. Adler, Interstate
Competition and the Race to the Top, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 89-92 (2012); David
S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1277,
1308-13 (2008); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-57 (1977) (offering counterarguments to the
commonly accepted theory that Delaware corporate law is leading a "race to the bottom").
Tiebout's classic article, arguing that competition among municipalities could generate
efficient provision of public goods, could also be seen as identifying a "race to the top."
2014] 533
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
leading to suboptimal legal equilibria. 15 Stewart Sterk's conclusion, formed in a
trusts context, is characteristic:
Jurisdictional competition is likely to lead a number of jurisdictions to adopt
trust law rules that those jurisdictions would not otherwise adopt-rules that,
historically, those jurisdictions have long rejected. Those rules may undermine
the policy of the enacting state without generating any compensating efficiency
advantages and are likely to undermine other states' policies without
generating compensating benefits. 16
Other literature describes some of the recent dramatic developments in the
trusts field. Each of the leading authors in the field-Professors John
Langbein,17 Robert Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach,18 Stewart Sterk,19 and
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418-20
(1956).
15 See sources cited supra note 13; see also Tomer Broude & Doron Teichman,
Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The Political Economy of Globalized Criminal Activity,
62 VAND. L. REv. 795, 828 n.134 (2009); Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal
Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REv.
1831, 1833 nn.10-16, 1858 n.147 (2005). For additional studies of jurisdictional competition
see, for example, ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 65-84 (2009);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 554 (2002); William W.
Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition:
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 243-64 (1997);
Dennis Epple & Allan Zelenitz, The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does
Tiebout Need Politics?, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 1197, 1198, 1200 (1981); Marcel Kahan & Ehud
Kamar, The Myth ofState Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REv. 679, 684 (2002);
Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1179, 1179 (2007); Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O'Hara, Corporations and
the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 661, 662; Mark J. Roe, Delaware's
Competition, 117 HARV. L. REv. 588, 590 (2003); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Shrinking Half-
Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 126 (2009).
16 See Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1074 (2000).
17 See generally John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law's Limits on the
Settlor's Power To Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REv. 375 (2010) [hereinafter Langbein,
Burn the Rembrandt]; John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1105 (2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory Rules]; John H. Langbein,
Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J.
929 (2005) [hereinafter Langbein, Duty of Loyalty]; John H. Langbein, Reversing the
Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 Mo. L. REv. 105 (1994) [hereinafter
Langbein, Nondelegation Rule]; John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and
the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REv. 641 (1996) [hereinafter Langbein, Uniform
Prudent Investor Act]; John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-
Investment Law, 1976 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1.
18 See generally Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent
Trust Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J.L. & EcoN. 681 (2007)
[hereinafter Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Reform]; Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff,
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Melanie Leslie20-has written on one or more specific recent instances of trust
law reform. Sitkoff, Schanzenbach and Sterk showed how jurisdictional
contests brought about the rise of perpetual trusts and asset protection trusts. 21
This Article innovates in aggregating no less than eight recent instances of trust
law reform, analyzing the evolutionary script followed by each and the
distributive consequences of each.22 My analysis yields a correlation between
the consequences of each reform for trust service providers, their clients ("trust
users"), and the rest of society ("trust non-users" or "trust non-parties") and the
evolutionary script followed by that reform, leading to the Article's normative
conclusions: two evolutionary scripts, the enactment into law of positions that
service providers earlier adopted by opting out of the then default law and
jurisdictional contests, are likelier than others to lead to welfare-reducing
reforms. Legislators should therefore examine reform proposals that followed
either of these two scripts with care, paying special attention to their distributive
consequences. I found that reforms originating in service providers' opt-outs
from the earlier law tended to transfer wealth from clients to service providers,
while reforms originating in jurisdictional contests tended to transfer wealth
from non-parties to both service providers and their clients. Regarding
Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOzo L. REV.
2465 (2006); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005)
[hereinafter Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition].
19 See generally Sterk, supra note 16; Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition To
Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 2097
(2003) [hereinafter Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition]; Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust
Law Reform: How Prudent Is Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 851
(2010) [hereinafter Sterk, Rethinking].
20 See generally Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary
Standards and Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 2713 (2006) [hereinafter Leslie,
Common Law]; Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to
Professor John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 541 (2005) [hereinafter Leslie, Response
to Langbein]; Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of
Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67 (2005) [hereinafter Leslie, Trusting Trustees].
21 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 18, at 359
(discussing the jurisdictional contests that led to the enactment of perpetual trust and asset
protection trust regimes, to 2003); Sterk, supra note 16, at 1037-39 (discussing the
jurisdictional contest that led to the enactment of asset protection trust regimes, to 2000).
22 My review of the recent transformation of the trust is far from complete. To keep the
proportions of this Article reasonable, I addressed eight reforms abolishing traditional trust
law rules, while omitting some of the new features introduced into trust practice. I do not
address, for example, the introduction of settlor-retained powers (for which see Terence Tan
Zhong Wei, The Irreducible Core Content of Modern Trust Law, 15 TR. & TRUSTEES 477,
491-93 (2009)) or of the "equitable deviation" doctrine (for which see Lee-ford Tritt, The
Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDozo L. REv. 2579,
2627-29 (2011)). I intend to discuss these innovations-the "clothing of the trust"-in
future work.
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jurisdictional contests, I affirm the majority view, holding that they tend to be
"races to the bottom," leading to suboptimal legal equilibria.
This is also the first Article to expand the conversation regarding the recent
wave of trust reforms beyond purely domestic reforms. Trusts have become a
field of law where Americans often use both foreign service providers and
regimes offered by foreign legal systems. Domestic trust reforms often emerge
as responses to reforms undertaken abroad: domestic asset protection trust
regimes, for example, were enacted in response to the enactment of similar
regimes by offshore legal systems. 23 Domestic trust reforms thus cannot be
understood absent at least some discussion of trust reforms abroad, and I have
attempted to integrate such discussion into this Article. This expanded ambit
makes possible a discussion of some recent trust reforms adopted
internationally which uproot fundamental trust law principles, such as the trend
favoring the adoption of trust regimes not involving equity. 24 I show that the
distributive consequences of such reforms are less harmful than those of
reforms adopted domestically, and that this difference is a result of the different
evolutionary scripts followed by each type of reform.
The Article unfolds as follows. In Part II, I describe eight aspects of "the
stripping of the trust": the current transformation of the law of trusts whereby
requirements, forms, and restrictions which were features of traditional trust law
are gradually eliminated. The reforms described are the 1990s reform of trust
investment law according to the lessons of Modern Portfolio Theory, abolishing
the earlier idea that some asset classes do not belong in a trust portfolio; the
concurrent reform of the rules governing the delegation of trustees' powers,
abolishing the traditional restrictions on such delegation; the rolling abolition of
the traditional rule against perpetuities, permitting perpetual trusts; the abolition
of the rule prohibiting asset protection trusts; the rise of "trusts without equity,"
trust regimes lacking the traditional law/equity duality, abolishing the
traditional idea that beneficiaries have rights in the trust assets; the abolition of
the traditional requirement that the trustee own the trust assets; the
transformation of much of the traditional law imposing extensive duties and
liabilities on trustees into default law; and the progressive curtailment of
beneficiaries' rights against their trustees. In Part III, I explain how each reform
described in Part II developed, emphasizing the evolutionary script followed by
each. In Part IV, I analyze the consequences of each reform, identifying the
impact of each on the various parties to trust relationships and on persons
unlikely to be parties to a trust. In Part V, I establish a correlation between the
evolutionary script followed and the distributive result obtained in each case,
and identify the normative implications of this correlation: that proposed
reforms originating in service providers' opt-outs of earlier law or jurisdictional
contests should be carefully scrutinized prior to enactment, as they are likely to
23 See infra text accompanying note 68.
24See infra Part II.G.
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have welfare-reducing distributive results. The Conclusion sums up my
argument.
I. THE STRIPPING PROCESS
Anglo-American law has long employed a fairly consistent understanding
of the trust. According to this understanding, a trust is an equitable obligation
imposed on the owner of an asset to hold it in a fiduciary capacity, using it for
the benefit of another or a permitted purpose, the asset being immune from the
owner's personal creditors and the beneficiary enjoying both rights in the asset
and personal rights against the trustee.25 Absent express provision to the
contrary, the fiduciary is not subject to either the trust creator's or the
beneficiaries' instructions concerning its exercise of its powers and
discretions.26 Recent decades, however, have seen the trust concept undergo a
rapid process of increasing variation: feature after feature of the traditional trust
concept has been changed, eliminated or made a mere default term.27 State after
state has modified aspects of the traditional model or made what were
mandatory requirements into default rules. This Part offers short descriptions of
eight aspects of the stripping process, consisting of the curtailment of
requirements, forms, and restrictions which were features of the traditional trust
model.28
A. The Reform of Trust Investment Law: From Prudent Man to Prudent
Investor
Until the 1990s, the law governing trustees' investment of trust property
was centered, in the United States, on the Prudent Man Rule, under which
trustees were required to "observe how men of prudence, discretion and
intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard
to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as
well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested," 29 and invest funds
251 rely, principally, on a recent English treatise, GERAINT THOMAS & ALASTAIR
HUDSON, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 11-12 (2d ed. 2010). The statement that trustees own the trust
property is taken from DAVID HAYTON, PAUL MATTHEWS & CHARLES MITCHELL,
UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 3 (18th ed. 2010). Martin
emphasizes, alternatively, that "property is vested in (a person or) persons called the
trustees." JILL E. MARTIN, HANBURY AND MARTIN MODERN EQUITY 47-48 (16th ed. 2001).
26 See, e.g., DONOVAN W. M. WATERS, THE INSTITUTION OF THE TRUST IN CIVIL AND
COMMON LAW 428, 434-35 (1995).
2 7 Dagan noticed "the recent trend in property law . .. away from mandatory rules and
toward default rules." HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 34 (2011).
For earlier waves of trust law reform see John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become
Statute Law in the United States?, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1069, 1070-78 (2007).
28 Despite aggregating more aspects of the process than discussions elsewhere in the
literature, my description is still, of necessity, selective. See supra note 22.
29 Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).
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under their administration similarly. The Prudent Man Rule was adopted by
most states in enacting the Model Prudent Man Investment Act, a 1940 model
statute sponsored by the American Bankers Association. While the Prudent Man
Rule and its statutory guises permitted trustee investment in equities generally,
it barred "speculative" investment by trustees, including investment in
"speculative" equities, defined to include stock in any company other than one
"with regular earnings and paying regular dividends which may reasonably be
expected to continue." 30 The Rule encouraged trustees to invest in both
government and corporate bonds, seen as prima facie proper trust investments.3 1
The Prudent Man Rule's pro-bond bias produced suboptimal results during
the post-World War II decades, which were characterized by stock rallies and
rising inflation. Once it was clear that conservative investment could lose
money, many felt a need for reform of trust investment law. 32 As John Langbein
put it in 1996, "[w]e now know that, in inflation-adjusted terms, the long-term
real rate of return on equities has greatly exceeded bonds." 33 Concurrently,
Modern Portfolio Theory, which has steadily gained in popularity through the
second half of the twentieth century, taught that industry-specific risk and firm-
specific risk could be greatly reduced through diversification, and that "the risk
intrinsic to any marketable security is presumptively already discounted into the
current price of the security." 34
These lessons of 1970s inflation and Modern Portfolio Theory, first applied
in a regulation interpreting the prudence standard in the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 35 were applied to trust investment law
generally in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule (1992),
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmts. f, m (1959); see Mayo Adams
Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 501-03 (1951); Langbein & Posner,
supra note 17, at 5; Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Reform, supra note 18, at 683-86 (describing
the adoption of the Prudent Man Rule and reforms that eventually led to its current form).
For the earlier history of U.S. trust investment law, see Lawrence M. Friedman, The
Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 551-72 (1964).
31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. f (1959).32 See Sterk, Rethinking, supra note 19, at 867-79, 881 (outlining the challenges with
trust investment generally and noting that even government bonds carry some risk).
33 Langbein, Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 17, at 645.
341d. at 647-49.
35 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(1)(i) (2010) (interpreting Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). The official
commentary to the regulation explains,
generally, the relative riskiness of a specific investment or investment course of action
does not render such investment or investment course of action either per se prudent or
per se imprudent, and . . . the prudence of an investment decision should not be judged
without regard to the role that the proposed investment or investment course of action
plays within the overall plan portfolio.
Rules and Regulations for Fiduciary Responsibility; Investment of Plan Assets Under the
"Prudence" Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,221, 37,222 (June 26, 1979).
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the first installment of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, completed in 2012
(Restatement (Third)), and the Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 1994 (UPIA).
While the prudence of diversification has long been a part of trustees' duty of
prudence, "[t]he 1992 revision of the Restatement of Trusts integrated the duty
to diversify into the very definition of prudent investing."36 The UPIA demands
that the "trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust unless the trustee
reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of
the trust are better served without diversifying." 37 Further, no longer were any
investments prima facie "proper" or "speculative." Any investment could now
be either proper or improper, depending on the characteristics of the trust in
which it was held, such as the trust's liquidity requirements, often dictated by
the needs of its beneficiaries. The Restatement (Third) states that the Prudent
Investor Rule "is to be applied to investments not in isolation but in the context
of the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment strategy." 38 The
UPIA provides "that the 'trustee's investment and management decisions' are
required to 'hav[e] risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust.'" 3 9
"Nearly all states" have adopted the reformed Prudent Investor Rule by
legislation. 40
B. The Liberalization of Trustee Delegation
Under traditional trust law, trustees were "under a duty to the beneficiary
not to delegate to others the doing of acts which the trustee can reasonably be
required personally to perform." 41 The courts distinguished between ministerial
functions, which could be delegated, and discretionary functions, which could
not.42 As some discretionary functions, notably the investment of trust funds,
have become increasingly complex during the twentieth century, opt-outs from
the non-delegation rule became common in trust instruments. Trustees of trusts
not including an opt-out developed a practice of de facto delegation, with
investment advisors recommending courses of action and trustees
independently, yet consistently, deciding to adopt them.43 The new reality of
frequent delegation of discretionary functions raised additional legal issues:
3 6 Langbein, Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 17, at 646.
3 7 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3, 7B U.L.A. 16 (Supp. 1995); see Langbein,
Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 17, at 646.
3 8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227(a) (1992)
(now at RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(a) (2007)); see also Langbein, Uniform
Prudent Investor Act, supra note 17, at 647 n.46.
39 See Langbein, Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 17, at 650 (quoting UNIF.
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b)).4 0 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007).
41 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 171 (1959).4 2 See Langbein, Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 17, at 651.
4 3 See id.
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trustees feared that even purchasing mutual funds for the trust might be
construed as (forbidden) "double dipping," as both trustees and fund managers
were being paid for investment services.4 The increasing inconvenience of the
non-delegation rule led to the states' enactment of legislation reversing it: first
legislation modeled on the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, which included a
clause permitting trustees "to employ one or more agents to perform any act of
administration, whether or not discretionary," 45 and later legislation modeled on
the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which included a similar provision,46 the
Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, which "authorize[d] the
governing boards of eleemosynary institutions, who are trustee-like fiduciaries,
to delegate investment matters," 47 and ERISA, which "allows a pension or
employee benefit plan to provide that 'authority to manage, acquire or dispose
of assets of the plan is delegated to one or more investment managers.' 48
The progressive liberalization of trustee delegation continued in the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule, which provided that:
[a] trustee has a duty personally to perform the responsibilities of the
trusteeship except as a prudent person might delegate those responsibilities to
others. In deciding whether, to whom and in what manner to delegate fiduciary
authority in the administration of a trust, and thereafter in supervising agents,
the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to exercise fiduciary discretion
and to act as a prudent person would act in similar circumstances.49
The UPIA provides similarly, and "imposes duties of care, skill, and caution
on trustees in selecting agents, in formulating the terms of the delegation, and in
reviewing 'the agent's performance and compliance with the terms of the
44 See Sterk, Rethinking, supra note 19, at 898.
45 See UNIF. TRs.' POWERS ACT § 3(24), 7B U.L.A. 748 (1985). The Act has been
adopted by sixteen states. See Langbein, Nondelegation Rule, supra note 17, at 111 & n.27.
46 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-715(21) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 170 (1998);
Langbein, Nondelegation Rule, supra note 17, at 111 n.27.
47 Langbein, Nondelegation Rule, supra note 17, at 111 (quoting UNIF. MGMT. OF INST.
FUNDS ACT § 5, 8 U.L.A. 170 (1998)). The Act has been adopted by thirty-four states and the
District of Columbia. Id. at 112.
4 8 Langbein, Nondelegation Rule, supra note 17, at 112-13 (quoting ERISA
§ 403(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(2) (2012)).
4 9 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 171 (1992). In the
full Restatement (Third), the section has been renumbered Section 80, and somewhat
rephrased:
(1) A trustee has a duty to perform the responsibilities of the trusteeship personally,
except as a prudent person of comparable skill might delegate those responsibilities to
others. (2) In deciding whether, to whom, and in what manner to delegate fiduciary
authority in the administration of a trust, and thereafter in supervising or monitoring
agents, the trustee has a duty to exercise fiduciary discretion and to act as a prudent
person of comparable skill would act in similar circumstances.
Id. § 80.
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delegation."' 50 A Restatement (Third) comment provides that trustees may even
sometimes have a duty to delegate their investment functions.51 Under both the
Restatement (Third) and the UPIA, trustees who comply with these duties are
thereby rendered not liable where despite their compliance, the delegate's
actions or omissions cause loss to the trust.52 Aggrieved beneficiaries "must
look exclusively to the agent." 53
C. The Fall of the Rule Against Perpetuities
Under the rule against perpetuities, a part of the traditional common law, 54
"a contingent future interest must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years after
the expiration of some life in being when the interest was created."55 By 2012,
twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia had either abolished the Rule or
extended their perpetuity periods to several hundred years.56
The driving force behind the erosion of the Rule was not a careful
reconsideration of the ancient common law policy against perpetuities, but
rather a 1986 reform to the federal tax code. Under the 1986 Code [as amended
to 2013, a transferor can pass $5 million, either during life or at death 57], free
from federal wealth transfer taxes. By passing this [exempted amount] in trust,
a transferor can ensure that successive generations benefit from the trust fund
[and any appreciation], free from federal wealth transfer taxes, for as long as
state perpetuities law will allow the trust to endure. 58
The 1986 tax code thus made the rule against perpetuities into "a highly
salient margin of differentiation" 59 between the states, and soon enough, state
banking and lawyer associations were pressuring state legislatures to abolish the
50 Langbein, Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 17, at 652-53 (quoting UNW.
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(a)(3) (1994)).
5 1See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. j (2007).52 Id. § 80 cmt. g; UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(c) (1994).
53 Langbein, Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 17, at 653.54 The rule was settled gradually, in a long series of English cases. The most frequently
cited are: The Duke of Norfolk's Case, [1682] 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch.) 949; Cadell v. Palmer,
[1832-1833] 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L.) 961 (appeal taken from Ch.).55 Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L.
REv. 1303, 1304 (2003). For early attempts at economic analysis of the rule see Jonathan R.
Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 306-10
(1988); A. I. Ogus, The Trust as Governance Structure, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 186, 214-17
(1986).
56 See Dynasty Trust States, L. OFF. OsmNs & AsSOCIATES LLC, http://www.oshins.
com/dynastytruststates.html (last visited July 22, 2013).
57 See I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3)(A) (LexisNexis 2013).
58 Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 18, at 359.
59 Id. at 374.
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rule, so as to sustain the state's attractiveness as a site of trust management. 60
Lawyers' anxiety to have the rule abolished was further founded on the
traditional rule's quirky complexity, a potential source of lawyer liability for
professional malpractice. 61 Once Delaware abolished its rule in 1995, abolition
spread quickly among the states.62 The choice of state A's trust law as
governing law of a trust settled by a resident of state B benefits trust service
providers in state A because to make the choice of that state's perpetuity-
friendly law stick, the settlor is likely to appoint a resident of state A as trustee
and transfer at least some of the trust funds to a financial institution in that
state. 63 Appointment as trustee and deposits of trust funds both generate fees for
the service providers involved. 64
D. The Rise of Self-settled Asset Protection Trusts
While U.S. trust law has, since the late nineteenth century, permitted
spendthrift trusts,65 beneficiaries' entitlements under which cannot be reached
by their creditors, it has not, until recently, permitted settlors to shield their
assets from their own creditors by placing them in spendthrift trusts for their
own benefit.66 Nor does the traditional law regard the granting of discretion to
trustees as to the amounts distributed to a settlor who is also a beneficiary of the
same trust as barring that settlor's creditors from access to trust monies: "[e]ven
if the trust is discretionary, spendthrift, or both, the settlor's creditors can reach
the maximum amount that the trustee can pay the settlor or apply for the
settlor's benefit." 67 Looking to draw foreign clients to their local trust service
providers, offshore jurisdictions started offering self-settled spendthrift trusts,
often called "asset protection trusts," during the 1980s, their legislation
providing that funds transferred on trust shall not be accessible by the settlor-
beneficiary's creditors. 68 U.S. states started reversing the rule against self-
6 0 See id. at 374 n.57 and sources cited (noting, for example, that the New Jersey
legislation abolishing the rule against perpetuities was "sponsored by the New Jersey
Bankers Association ... so that New Jersey trust institutions could avoid losing potential
dynasty trust business and other types of trust business to Delaware, South Dakota, and
Alaska" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Stephen Clowney, Property in Law:
Government Rights in Legal Innovations, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10-12 (2011).
61 See Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 19, at 2100-01.
6 2 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 18, at 376.
6 3 See id. at 374.
64 See id.
65 For the different trajectories of English and U.S. law on this regard, see Joshua
Getzler, Transplantation and Mutation in Anglo-American Trust Law, 10 THEORETICAL
INQUiRES LAW 355, 358-61 (2009).
6 6 See id. at 360.
6 7 Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 18, at 380.
6 8 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 32-38 (1996)
(contains a fine explanation of how such a trust judgment-proofs); Sterk, supra note 16, at
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settled spendthrift trusts in 1997.69 Alaska and Delaware were the first of (so
far) fourteen states to enact Domestic Asset Protection Trust (DAPT) statutes,
again targeting mainly out-of-state settlors. 70 The political economy mechanism
behind these legislative adjustments is similar to that behind abolition of the
rule against perpetuities: choice of a state's law to govern a trust generates
income to trust service providers resident in that state. 71
E. Curtailment of Trustees'Duties and Liabilities
Trustees' duties under traditional law, which many scholars believe to be
indispensable, 72 have, in fact, long been stripped away by trust service
providers. Such providers have since, at the latest, the mid-eighteenth century
been drafting trust instruments so as to exempt themselves from parts of the
heavy burden of liability imposed on them by the default law.73 The last thirty
years have seen a further erosion in the extent of liability trustees must bear, as
onshore and offshore jurisdictions have raced to reduce that extent so as to
attract trustees to the trust regimes they offer. Many U.S. states have limited
trustees' personal contractual liability to trust creditors to cases where trustees'
fiduciary capacity was not disclosed,74 and their personal liability for torts
1047-51. On offshore jurisdictions' impact on the world economy see NICHOLAS SHAXSON,
TREASURE ISLANDS 63-148, 193-220 (2011).6 9 See John K. Eason, Home from the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust
Alternatives Impact Traditional Estate and Gift Tax Planning Considerations, 52 FLA. L.
REV. 41, 47-51 (2000); Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 18,
at 380-82; Sterk, supra note 16, at 1051-55.
7 0 See AM. COLL. OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL, ACTEC COMPARISON OF THE
DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUST STATUTES (David G. Shaftel ed., 2012), available at
http://www.actec.org/public/documents/studies/shaftel dapt chart_06_30_2012.pdf;
Kenneth J. Laino, Ohio Enacts Domestic Asset Protection Statute, ASSET PROTECTION L.J.
(Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.assetprotectionlawjournal.com/2013/01/articles/domestic-asset-
protection-trus/ohio-enacts-domestic-asset-protection-trust-statute. For the development of
DAPTs, see John K. Eason, Policy, Logic, and Persuasion in the Evolving Realm of Trust
Asset Protection, 27 CARDOzO L. REV. 2621, 2654-62, 2667-77 (2006); Adam J. Hirsch,
Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOzO L. REV. 2685, 2697 (2006).
71 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 18, at 383.72 See, e.g., Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law,
Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 651, 661-63 (2002)
(contrasting trust law, supposedly characterized by a strict application of such duties, with
corporate law, which imposes weaker standards and does not seriously enforce them).
Compare Luc Th6venoz, Trusts: The Rise ofa Global Legal Concept, in EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW: A HANDBOOK 22, 22-23 (Mauro Bussani & Franz Werro eds., 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1723236, with id. at 22 (comparing his
acceptance that "the vesting of legal title with the trustee is inconsequential").
73 See CHANTAL STEBBINGS, THE PRIVATE TRUSTEE IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 123-25
(2002); Peter Luxton, Trustee Exclusion Clauses: Lost in the Heather?, in 1 MODERN
STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 59, 59-75 (Elizabeth Cooke ed., 2001).
74 The British Virgin Islands have since 2003 provided a similar regime as an option.
BVI Trustee Act, 1961 § 97(3) (amended 2003) (Virgin Is.).
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committed in the course of administering a trust and obligations arising from
ownership or control of trust property to cases where trustees were personally at
fault. 75 In other cases, trust creditors' sole recourse is against the trust fund.76
Many offshore jurisdictions have similarly restricted trustees' personal liability
to trust creditors.77
As for "exculpatory terms," exempting trustees from liability to
beneficiaries for infringing actions and omissions, different jurisdictions allow
them to different extents. Most U.S. states, as well as England, the Bahamas and
the Cayman Islands, permit the exclusion of all trustee liability to beneficiaries
except liability for fraudulent actions and those taken in bad faith, dishonestly,
or out of a reckless indifference to the impact of trustee actions on beneficiaries'
interests.78 California, as well as Canada, Scotland, Jersey, Guernsey, Malta,
75 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1010 (a)-(b), 7C U.L.A. 657-58 (2006), the substance of
which has been enacted, as of 2012, in twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia; see
references to each state statute in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 105 reporter's
notes cmt. c (2012). The UPC, having been substantially adopted by nineteen states,
provides similarly in Section 7-306, adding a requirement that for trustees to be personally
liable "on contracts properly entered into in [their] fiduciary capacity," they must fail to
identify the liable trust estate in the contract. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-306, 8 U.L.A. 483-
84 (1997); see also 4 MARK L. ASCHER, AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 26 (5th ed. 2010) [hereinafter ScoTT ON
TRUSTS]; 14 AMY MORRIS HESS, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 712-16, 732, 735 (3d ed. 2009); Henry Hansmann &
Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 434, 459-61 (1998).
76 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1010(c), 7C U.L.A. 657-58 (2006); UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 7-306(c), 8 U.L.A. 484 (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 105-106. For the
traditional law, limiting trust creditors' recourse to the trust fund to an indirect approach by
way of subrogation into the trustee's right to indemnity from that fund, see Kalev J.
Crossland, Unsecured Creditors and the "Uncorporation ": Issues with Trading Trusts Post
Global Financial Crisis, 17 TR. & TRUSTEES 185, 194-98 (2011); Paul Heath, Bringing
Trading Trusts into the Company Line, 16 TR. & TRUSTEES 690, 692-99 (2010). Under that
law, in order to limit their liability to the trust fund, trustees must expressly contract "as
trustee and not otherwise." Crossland, supra, at 190.
77 See PAOLO PANICO, INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS 253-61 (2010). See, for example,
Jersey, where third parties knowing that the trustee is acting as such have recourse against
the trust property alone, unless the trustee acted in breach of trust. Trusts Law, 1984, art. 32
(Jersey) (discussed in Bruce Lincoln & Andrew Bridgeford, Trustees' Liability to Third
Parties: Jersey v England, 17 TR. & TRUSTEES 930, 930-36 (2011)).
78 In the United States, Uniform Trust Code Section 1008, adopted in twenty-seven
states, see supra note 75, provides that exculpatory terms are unenforceable to the extent that
they relieve trustees "of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless
indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries." UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 1008, U.L.A. 654-55 (1998). It is further provided that in case a trustee drafted the
exculpatory term, or caused it to be drafted, the trustee must prove in court that the term is
"fair under the circumstances and that its existence and contents were adequately
communicated to the settlor," otherwise the term is held "invalid as an abuse of a fiduciary
or confidential relationship" and is unenforceable. Id.; see Langbein, Mandatory Rules,
supra note 17, at 1123-25 (discussion); Leslie, Common Law, supra note 20, at 2742-52;
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Mauritius, and the Dubai International Financial Center hold liability for gross
negligence, too, to be inexcludable, 79 while Bermuda, the Turks and Caicos
Islands, and, last but not least, New York, safeguard even liability for plain
negligence from exclusion (the latter, as regards executors and testamentary
trustees).80
Settlors of "trading" trusts, constituted as succession vehicles for family-
controlled businesses, often want their trustees to refrain from intervening in, or
Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 20, at 85-88, 96-119 (noting that the Uniform Trust
Code followed the lead of many state legislatures in authorizing exculpatory clauses). The
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96(1) (2012) uses similar language, adding that
provisions purporting to relieve trustees of accountability for profits derived from a breach
of trust are unenforceable. Some U.S. courts seem to be more restrictive in construing
specific exculpatory terms than the statutory provisions cited appear to require. See Leslie,
Trusting Trustees, supra note 20, at 74 n.42 (citing cases); see also ScoTT ON TRUSTS, supra
note 75, §§ 24.27-27.3; HESS, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 75, § 542. For English law,
see Armitage v. Nurse, [1998] Ch. 241 at 251-56 (Eng.), followed by the majority of the
Privy Council panel to hear Spread Tr. Co. Ltd. v. Hutcheson, [2011] UKPC 13, [2012] 2
A.C. 194, [57], [108] (appeal taken from Gue.), as well as in Walbrook Tr. (Jersey) Ltd. v.
Fattal, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 427 (Eng.); Derinda Baker v. JE Clark & Co. (Transport) UK
Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 464, [15]-[20] (Eng.); Walker v. Stones, [2001] Q.B. 902 at 903
(Eng.); Bogg v. Raper (1998, 1999) 1 I.T.E.L.R. 267, 278-87 (Eng.); Re Clapham,
Barraclough v. Mell, [2005] EWHC (Ch.) 3387, [89-102]. For the older English cases see
Joshua Getzler, Duty of Care, in BREACH OF TRUST 41, 50-73 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto
eds., 2002). For the Cayman Islands, see Lemos v. Coutts Ltd., [2003] CILR 381 at 401-12
(Grand Ct.). For the Bahamas, see PANICO, supra note 77, at 298-301.
79 Califomia: CAL. PROB. CODE § 16461(b) (West 2012). Canada: see David Fuller &
Laura Kerr, Delegation to Agents, in WIDDIFIELD ON EXECUTORS AND TRUSTEES § 9.3.1
(Carmen S. Th6riault ed., 6th ed. 2002); DONOVAN W.M. WATERS, MARK R. GILLEN &
LIONEL D. SMITH, WATERS' LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA 981-84 (4th ed. 2012). Scotland:
Wyman v. Paterson, [1900] A.C. 271 (H.L.) 274-79 (appeal taken from Scot.); Carruthers v.
Carruthers, [1896] A.C. 659 (H.L.) 662-66 (appeal taken from Scot.); Rae v. Meek, (1889)
14 App. Cas. 558 (H.L.) 563-73 (appeal taken from Scot.); Knox v. Mackinnon, (1888) 13
App. Cas. 753 (H.L.) 764-67 (appeal taken from Scot.); Lutea Trs. Ltd. v. Orbis Trs.
Guernsey Ltd., (1997) S.C. 255, 264 (Scot.); Wilson v. Guthrie Smith, (1894) 2 S.L.T. 338,
339-40 (Scot.); Carruthers v. Cairns, (1890) 17 R. 769, 769-81 (Scot.); Seton v. Dawson,
(1841) 4 D. 310, 310-24 (Scot.). Jersey: Trusts (Jersey) Law, 1984, art. 30(10); Midland
Bank Trust Co. (Jersey) Ltd. v. Federated Pension Servs., [1995] J.L.R. 352, 391-94; West
v. Lazard Bros. & Co. (Jersey) Ltd., [1993] J.L.R. 165, 301. Guernsey: The Trusts
(Guernsey) Law, 2007, § 39. Malta: Malta Trusts and Trustees Act, 1998, c. 331, § 21(7)
(amended 2004). Mauritius: Trusts Act, 2001, § 50(6). Dubai International Financial Centre:
Trust Law, 2005, § 58(10). See discussion in PANICO, supra note 77, at 302-09, 315-16.
80 Bermuda: Trustee Act, 1975, § 22(1) (amended 2009). Turks and Caicos Islands:
Trusts Ordinance, 1990, § 20(10); New York: N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.7
(McKinney 2012). Compare PANICO, supra note 77, at 315 (discussion), with In re Shore,
854 N.Y.S.2d 293, 296 (Sur. Ct. 2008) (concluding that the New York statute "applies
equally to inter vivos trusts where by its terms there is no one in a position to protect the
beneficiaries from the actions of the trustee"). For the history of the Estates Powers and
Trust Law section in question, and some earlier New York cases parsing it, see Leslie,
Trusting Trustees, supra note 20, at 104 nn. 171-80 and accompanying text.
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even monitoring, company management, leaving the settlor, and later his or her
chosen successors, at the helm. The official comment to the UPIA recognizes
that "[t]he wish to retain a family business is [a] situation in which the purposes
of the trust sometimes override the conventional duty to diversify." 81 English
courts have approved clauses permitting the retention of such businesses even
when unprofitable, absolving trustees from involving themselves in
management and from considering sale and reinvestment.82
F. Curtailment ofBeneficiaries' Rights
Even beneficiaries' rights against their trustees, perhaps the most
entrenched element of the traditional trust model, are now gradually declining.
While the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) provided, upon its 2000 promulgation,
that trustees must notify at least some beneficiaries of irrevocable trusts who are
twenty-five or older "of the existence of the trust, of the identity of the trustee,
and of their right to request trustee's reports," 83 and that they must respond to a
request by such beneficiaries "for trustee's reports and other information
reasonably related to the administration of a trust,"84 most states enacting the
Code have enacted those duties, if at all, in weakened form,85 and they were
81 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3 cmt. (1994); Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt,
supra note 17, at 394-95 (discussion). For judicial decisions validating trustee conduct based
on retention clauses, see, for example, In re The Jervis C. Webb Trust, No. 263759, 2006
WL 173172, at *2-4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2006); Nat'l City Bank v. Noble, No. 85696,
2005 WL 3315034, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2005), which are both discussed in David
Thayne Leibell et al., Holding Family Business Interests in Trust: Does a Trustee's Duty To
Diversify Override a Settlor's Intent?, 151 TR. & EST., Mar. 2012, at 48, 50, 52-53, 55-56.
82 Absent such clauses, trustees' duties of care, prudence and the fiduciary duties they
owe beneficiaries would have mandated, under English law, close monitoring of director
action, trustees' joining the board, and potential replacement of existing directors, as well as
serious consideration of selling the shareholding when alternative investment opportunities
appear more lucrative. Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co. (No. 2), [1980] 1 Ch. 539 at 542-
46 (Eng.); In re Lucking's Will Trusts, [1968] 1 W.L.R. 866 (Ch.) at 873-77 (Eng.). For
English courts' approval of "anti-Bartlett clauses," see Gregson v. HAE Trs. Ltd., [2008]
EWHC (Ch.) 1006 (Eng.); A v. A, [2007] EWHC (Fam.) 99 (Eng.); see also PANIco, supra
note 77, at 182-84.
83 UNiF. TRUST CODE § 813(b)(2)-(3), 7C U.L.A. 609-10 (2006) (made mandatory in
Section 105(b)(8), 7C U.L.A. 428). On the necessity of providing beneficiaries with
information sufficient for them to enforce trustees' duties see Langbein, Mandatory Rules,
supra note 17, at 1125-26.
84 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(a) (2005), 7C U.L.A. 609 (2006) (made mandatory in
Section 105(b)(9), 7C U.L.A. 428).
85 Information on the amendments enacting states have made to the UTC is provided on
the Uniform Law Commission website. Trust Code, UNIFORM L. CoMiSSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trust%20Code (last visited July 22, 2013). Of
the twenty-five states to have enacted the Code as of July 2012, fifteen have made trustees'
duties to give beneficiaries information default law, contrary to the original UTC
recommendation that they be made mandatory. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(9), 7C
U.L.A. 428 (2006).
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made optional in a 2004 amendment to the Code.86 The 2007 installment of the
Restatement (Third) also permits some curtailment of beneficiaries' rights to
information about the trust.87 In England, the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council held in Schmidt v. Rosewood Trust Ltd., a 2003 decision, "that a
beneficiary's right or claim to disclosure of trust documents or information"88 is
not best approached, as in the earlier case of O'Rourke v. Darbishire,89 as a
function of his or her proprietary rights in the trust property, but as "one aspect
of the court's inherent jurisdiction to supervise, and where appropriate to
intervene in, the administration of trusts."90 What was earlier seen as an aspect
of beneficiaries' rights in the trust property is now seen as a remedy in the
discretion of the court.91
86 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 cmt. entitled "2004 Amendment," 7C U.L.A. 431-32
(2006); T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee's Duty To Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1598-1605
(2007) (discussion).
87 The Restatement (Third) allows the curtailment of beneficiaries' rights to
information, while stating that enough information should be provided so that beneficiaries
are able to safeguard their rights. While permitting the modification "in the terms of the
trust" of trustees' duty to provide beneficiaries with information about "the existence of the
trust ... their status as beneficiaries and their right to obtain further information,
and ... basic information concerning the trusteeship . .. significant changes in their
beneficiary status; and ... changes involving the trusteeship and about other significant
developments concerning the trust and its administration," RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 82(1) (2007), the Restatement warns that:
a beneficiary is always entitled under [§ 82(2)] to request such information as is
reasonably necessary to enable the beneficiary to prevent or redress a breach of trust
and otherwise to enforce his or her rights under the trust. Furthermore, although subject
to modification by trust provision, the duty to provide information to certain
beneficiaries under [§ 82(1)] may not be dispensed with entirely or to a degree or for a
time that would unduly interfere with the underlying purposes or effectiveness of the
information requirements.
Id. § 82 cmt. a(2). As regards beneficiaries' rights to trustees' reports or accountings, the
Restatement allows that they may be modified, and even satisfied by trustees' submitting
reports or accountings only to a "designated person," who may or may not be a beneficiary;
but such arrangements are subject to judicial review for abuse. Id. § 83 cmts. b, d.
88 [2003] UKPC 26 [50], [66], [2003] 2 A.C. 709, 729, 734 (appeal taken from the Isle
of Man) (Eng.).
89 [19201 A.C. 581 (H.L.) 592-93 (Eng.).
9 0 Schmidt, 2 A.C. at 729, 734. For further discussion, see, for example, Gerwyn LL H
Griffiths, "You Just Gotta Keep the Customer Satisfied": Where Stands the Beneficiary's
Right to Information?, in 5 MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 145, 152-57 (Martin Dixon
ed., 2009); Jonathan Hilliard, The Rights to Information of an Object of a Fiduciary Mere
Power, 10 J. INT'L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 209, 216-20 (2003); Lionel Smith, Access to Trust
Information: Schmidt v. Rosewood Trust Ltd., 23 EST. TR. & PENSIONS J. 1, 4-7 (2003);
Richard Wilson & Henrietta Labes, Schmidt v Rosewood: A Closer Inspection, PRIVATE
CLIENT Bus., May & June 2004, at 161, 162-68. See generally Gavin Lightman, The
Trustees' Duty To Provide Information to Beneficiaries, PRIVATE CLIENT Bus., no. 1, 2004,
at 23.
91 See Schmidt, 2 A.C. at 734.
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While few jurisdictions deny that for an arrangement to qualify as a trust,
someone must have the power to control trustees' exercise of their powers,
some now decouple that power from beneficiary status. Most radically, Cayman
Islands trust law has since 1997 included an elective "Alternative Regime,"
under which the rights of a beneficiary of an ordinary trust-to bring actions
against trustees and third parties, to apply to the court concerning the trust and
to receive trust documents and other information concerning the trust from its
trustees-are allocated to an "enforcer," who may or may not be a beneficiary.
Unless appointed enforcers, beneficiaries have no standing to enforce the trust,
"an enforceable right against a trustee or an enforcer, or an enforceable right to
the trust property." 92 Non-beneficiary enforcers having first appeared in
legislation permitting non-charitable purpose trusts, 93 where absent an enforcer
or protector no one could control the trustees, the Cayman Islands innovated by
inserting them in "people trusts," decoupling trust enforcement from beneficiary
status. The UTC accorded non-beneficiary enforcers a far cooler welcome, only
permitting them in non-charitable purpose trusts and trusts for animal
beneficiaries, 94 while the Restatement (Third) permits non-beneficiary enforcers
as an addition to, but not a replacement for, beneficiaries' enforcement
powers.95
G. Trusts Without Equity
The final two trust reforms to be discussed are yet to occur domestically
(outside Louisiana), while accelerating in many foreign jurisdictions. First is the
noticeable trend of jurisdictions adopting "trusts without equity," trusts absent
the law/equity duality and beneficiaries' consequent rights in the trust assets.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has recently decided that "a beneficiary has no
title to or ownership interest in trust property, but only a civilian 'personal right'
92 Trusts Law (2009 Revision) § 100 (Cayman Islands); see also id §§ 95-109
(incorporating Cayman Islands Special Trusts (Alternative Regime) Law, 1997, as Part
VIII); id. § 102 (laying out the rights of enforcers). Perhaps importantly, Section 106,
entitled "theft," provides that "for the purpose of the Penal Code ... property held upon a
special trust shall be regarded [as against its trustees and enforcers] as belonging to
others . . . [and a trustee or enforcer's intention] to defeat the trust shall be regarded . . . as an
intention to deprive others of their property." Id. § 106.
93 As in Jersey: Trusts (Amendment No. 3) (Jersey) Law, 1996, art. 10A-B; the Isle of
Man: Purpose Trusts Act, 1996, §§ 1, 3; and Bermuda: Trusts (Special Provisions)
Amendment Act, 1998, §§ 12A-B.
94 The UTC permits non-beneficiary enforcers where beneficiaries are animals alive
during the settlor's lifetime, UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408, 7C U.L.A. 490 (2006), and otherwise
for up to twenty-one years, id. § 409, 7C U.L.A. 493-94 (2006). The UTC's drafters rejected
the freer use of non-beneficiary enforcers common in some offshore jurisdictions. David M.
English, The American Uniform Trust Code, in EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF TRUSTS
AND SIMILAR RING-FENCED FUNDS 313, 322 (David Hayton ed., 2002).
95 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94 cmt. d(l) (2012).
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vis-A-vis the trustee."96 The first trust jurisdiction to let go of beneficiaries'
rights in the trust property, however, was Scotland. Its civilian system of private
law being attached, like other civilian legal systems, to the unitary ownership
ideal, Scots law could never admit that beneficiaries own the trust property side-
by-side with their trustees.97 The next jurisdiction to welcome trusts while
leaving equitable ownership at the door was India: beneficiaries under the
Indian Trusts Act have rights against their trustees rather than rights in the trust
property.98 South Africa rejected beneficiaries' equitable ownership of the trust
property in 1905, fearful of its land registration system being subverted by
beneficiaries of unregistered trusts of immovables, to use the South African
term, enjoying a preference over their insolvent trustees' personal (non-trust)
creditors.99 Colonial-era Ceylon adopted the Indian solution in its own Trusts
Ordinance.' 00 More recently, Jersey, the original island, has "enact[ed] the
central body of English trusts law without any reference to legal or equitable
estates."101 And despite having been adopted in frank imitation of the common
law trust, the fiducie and fideicomiso regimes of Latin civil law systems all
96 Bridges v. Autozone Props., Inc., 900 So. 2d 784, 796-97 (La. 2005); see also Read
v. United States ex rel. Dep't of Treasury, 169 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1999); EDWARD E.
CHASE, JR., 11 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TRUSTS 4 (2d ed. 2009).
97 See George Gretton, Scotland: The Evolution of the Trust in a Semi-civilian System,
in ITINERA FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND TREUHAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 507, 509-10
(Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1998) [hereinafter Gretton, Scotland];
George Gretton, Trusts, in 1 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN SCOTLAND 480, 481-82
(Kenneth Reid & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2000); George L. Gretton, Trusts Without
Equity, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 599, 599, 619-20 (2000); K.G.C. Reid, National Report for
Scotland, in 1 PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TRUST LAW 67, 69-72 (D.J. Hayton, S.C.J.J.
Kortmann & H.L.E Verhagen eds., 1999); Kenneth G. C. Reid, Patrimony Not Equity: The
Trust in Scotland, 3 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 427, 431 (2000).
98 See Indian Trusts Act, Act No. 2 of 1882, INDIA CODE (1993), vol. VIII-B, § 3
(describing the trustee as "the owner" and noting that the "'interest' of the beneficiary is his
right against the trustee as owner of the trust-property"). For pre-1882 Indian trusts law, see
Tagore v. Tagore (1872) I.A. 47, 80-85 (India); see also B. M. GANDHI, EQUITY, TRUSTS
AND SPECIFIC RELIEF 239-40 (1983).
99 See Lucas' Tr. v. Ismail & Amod 1905 TS 239 (CC) at 240-46 (S. Afr.) (analyzed in
Tony Honor6, Trust, in SOUTHERN CROSS: CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA
849, 862-63 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel Visser eds., 1996)).
100 See Ceylon Trusts Ordinance, No. 9 of 1917, Ch. 11; 3 LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
OF CEYLON ch. 87 (1956) (defining, in Section 3(a), a trust as "an obligation ... of such a
character that, while the ownership is nominally vested in the owner, the right to the
beneficial enjoyment of the property is vested or to be vested in [the beneficiary]," and the
"beneficial interest," in Section 3(g), as "[the beneficiary's] right against the trustee as
owner of the trust property"); see also L. J. M. COORAY, THE RECEPTION IN CEYLON OF THE
ENGLISH TRUST 65 (1971).
101 WATERS, supra note 26, at 362-63; see id. at 362-64; see also Trusts (Jersey) Law,
1984.
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reject the split ownership trust model and beneficiaries' rights in the trust
assets. 102
H. Elimination ofRequirement that Trustees Own the Trust Property
More radically, some trust jurisdictions, not including any U.S. state, do not
require that the trustee own the trust property. The jurisdictions concerned fall
into two groups. The first consists of "shapeless trust"103 jurisdictions, which
leave those settling trusts free to allocate title in the assets to whichever point of
the "trust triangle" they choose: settlor, trustee, or beneficiary. There are
currently two such jurisdictions: China and Israel. The Chinese Trust Act of
2001 defines a trust as a situation where:
the settler, based on his faith in trustee [sic], entrusts his property rights to the
trustee and allows the trustee to, according to the will of the settlor and in the
name of the trustee, administer or dispose of such property in the interest of a
beneficiary or for any intended purposes. 104
Both the Chinese courts and commentators have interpreted this definition,
in light of the other provisions of the Act, not to mandate the transfer of title in
the trust assets from settlor to trustee.105 The Israeli Trust Act of 1979 defines
102 See Frangois Barribre, The French Fiducie, or the Chaotic Awakening of a Sleeping
Beauty, in RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST: TRUSTS IN THE CIVIL LAW 222, 237 (Lionel Smith ed.,
2012) (France); Dante Figueroa, Civil Law Trusts in Latin America: Is the Lack of Trusts an
Impediment for Expanding Business Opportunities in Latin America?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 701, 706 (2007) (fideicomisos of Latin America); see also NICOLAS MALUMIAN,
TRUSTS IN LATIN AMERICA 25, 144-54 (2009) (same). For the Quebec fiducie, see sources
cited infra note 108.
103 The "shapeless trust" moniker was coined by Maurizio Lupoi for the definition of the
trust in the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition.
Maurizio Lupoi, The Shapeless Trust, 1 TR. & TRUSTEES 15, 16-17 (1995); and see full
discussion in MAURIzIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 327-67 (Simon Dix trans.,
2000).
104 Xintuo Fa ({%R) [Trust Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Apr. 28, 2001, effective Oct. 1, 2001) 2001 STANDING COMM. NAT'L
PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. 311 (China) (emphasis added).
105 See Yanxin Co. v. Huabao Trust & Inv. Co., (Shanghai High People's Ct. Mar. 16,
2005) (China); Beijing Haidian Sci. & Tech. Dev. Co. v. Shenzhen Xinhua Jinyuan Touzi
Fazhan Youxian Gongsi, (Chongqing High People's Ct. Mar. 19, 2007); LUSINA Ho, TRUST
LAW IN CHINA 37-42 (2003); Frances H. Foster, American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror,
94 MINN. L. REv. 602, 629-30, 638-42 (2010); David Hayton, The Core of the Chinese
Trust Law 2001, 3 TR. Q. REv. 24 (2005); Lusina Ho, China: Trust Law and Practice Since
2001, 16 TR. & TRUSTEES 124, 124-25 (2010); Lusina Ho, The People's Republic of China,
in THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST 825, 828 (John Glasson & Geraint Thomas eds., 2d ed. 2006);
Lusina Ho, The Reception of Trust in Asia: Emerging Asian Principles of Trust?, 2004 SING.
J. LEGAL. STUD. 287, 293-303; Lusina Ho, Trust Laws in China: History, Ambiguity and
Beneficiary's Rights, in RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST, supra note 102, at 183, 193-97
[hereinafter Ho, Trust Laws in China: History]; Rebecca Lee, Conceptualizing the Chinese
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the trust as "a relationship to any property by virtue of which a trustee is bound
to hold the same, or to act in respect thereof, in the interest of a beneficiary or
for some other purpose."1 06 Ending thirty years of uncertainty, the Israeli courts
have recently ruled that the 1979 Act does not in fact require that title in the
trust property vests in the trustee. 0 7
The second group of trust jurisdictions which do not require that title in the
trust assets vests in the trustee is led by Qu6bec, which provided in its civil code
that "[t]he trust patrimony ... constitutes a patrimony by appropriation,
autonomous and distinct from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in
which none of them has any real right." 08 The Qu6becois model, providing that
the trust assets are owned by no one but rather form an autonomous "patrimony
by appropriation," has in recent years been adopted in Uruguay, and is about to
be adopted in the new Czech Civil Code.109
Trust, 58 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 655, 659-63 (2009); Donovan Waters, The Future ofthe Trust
Part I, 13 J. INT'L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 179, 219-22 (2006).106 Trust Law, 5739-1979, 33 LSI 154, § 1 (1978-1979) (Isr.).
107 See CA 5955/09 Amster v. Tauber Tov 4-5 [2011], Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.); CA 6406/03 Endowment Trs. of the Sephardi Cmty. of Sephad &
Meiron v. Kamus 7-12 [2005], Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); CA 1631/02
Gorban v. Tshuva Yitzchak Ass'n for Solving the Hous. Shortage, 5-8 [2003], Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.); DC (Jer) 4044/07 Hoffmann v. Official Receiver-
Jerusalem Dist., 7, 9-10 [2009], Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); DC (TA)
548/06 Arnon v. Pyotrkovski 21-23, 25-26 [2009], Nevo Legal Database (by subscription)
(Isr.); see also SHLOMO KEREM, TRUSTS 37-39 (4th ed. 2004); LuPOi, TRUSTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 103, at 279, 305 n.228, 334; Avraham Alter, The "Cestui
que Trust's" Right in the Trust Property, 35 HAPRAKLIT 307, 307 (1984); WATERS, supra
note 26, at 376-78; Avraham Alter, Taxation of Ordinary Trusts in Israel 22-62 (Jan. 1985)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tel-Aviv University) (on file with author). A notable early
article argued, contra, that the Act should be read to require that title in the trust assets be
transferred to the trustee, as in the orthodox common law model. Joshua Weisman,
Shortcomings in the Trust Law, 1979, 15 ISR. L. REV. 372, 379-80 (1980).
108 Civil Code of Qu6bec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 1261 (Can.); see discussion by JOHN B.
CLAXTON, STUDIES ON THE QUEBEC LAW OF TRUST 59-60, 174-75 (2005); WATERS ET AL.,
supra note 79, at 1409-44; Madeleine Cantin-Cumyn, La Fiducie, un Nouveau Sujet de
Droit?, in MtLANGES ERNEST CAPARROS 129, 129-43 (Jacques Beaulne ed., 2002);
WATERS, supra note 26, at 396-407, 429-32.
109 See, for Uruguay, Ley de Fideicomiso, No 17.703 (Uru.); see also Waters, supra note
105, at 197-98. For discussion of the new draft civil code of the Czech Republic, see TomBi
Richter, National Report for the Czech Republic, in 10 TOWARDS AN EU DIRECTIVE ON
PROTECTED FUNDS 59, 65-70 (S.C.J.J. Kortmann et al. eds., 2009). See also the fiddicommis
under the Civil Code of the Empire of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 165 of 1960, which is
defined in section 516 as "I'institution en vertu de la quelle un ou plusieurs biens sont
constitues en une masse autonome, pour etre administr6e par une personne, le
fid6icommissaire, selon les instructions donn6es par le constituant du fiddicommis" ["the
institution under which one or more properties are constituted into an independent fund, to
be administered by a person, the trustee, in accordance with the instructions of the settlor"].
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III. EVOLUTIONARY SCRIPTS
In this Part, I examine the evolutionary scripts followed by the eight trust
reforms described in Part II. Part IV then analyzes their distributive
consequences, leading to the identification, in Part V.A, of a correlation
between the evolutionary script followed by each reform and its distributive
consequences. This in turn leads to my normative recommendations, which
follow in Part V.B.
A. From Drafted Opt-Outs, Through Uniform Laws, to Legislation: Trust
Investment Law and Trustee Delegation Reform
1. Reform of Trust Investment Law
The evolutionary script followed by the early 1990s reform of trust
investment law started with practitioner and client dissatisfaction at the losses
consequent on following the Prudent Man Rule, as construed by the courts,
during the high-inflation 1960s and 1970s. This dissatisfaction first led to the
ousting of the Rule by drafters of individual trusts, allowing trustees to invest in
any asset.110 Even trustees emboldened by such clauses, however, remained
subject to potential ex post review by the courts, which interpreted even broad
investment clauses against the background of the existing Rule." In response,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
and American Law Institute (ALI), both principally staffed by academics and
practicing lawyers, proposed the switch from prudent man to prudent investor, a
proposal which was soon enacted by nearly all states.
2. Trustee Delegation Reform
Much as in the case of trust investment law reform, the evolutionary script
followed in the reform of the law of trustee delegation involved legal practice
falling out of sync with the law, which drove the affected practitioners and
concerned academics to recommend that the law be changed so as to catch up
with practice. While the classical law of trusts demanded that trustees not
delegate functions involving discretion, the tasks given trustees in practice and
the composition of trust funds changed so as to practically require, in many
cases, that trustees delegate at least some discretionary functions. Trust drafters
first responded by either drafting trust instruments so as to opt out of the non-
delegation rule or practicing de facto delegation, disguised as consultation.
Later, trustees' dissatisfaction with that rule led them to move the NCCUSL and
110 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man
Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 52, 76 n.99 (1987).
I11 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Reform, supra note 18, at 685 n. 11.
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ALI to propose, and state legislatures to enact, a liberalized regime governing
trustee delegation."12
B. Jurisdictional Contests: Fall of the R.A.P., Rise ofAsset Protection
Trusts, and Curtailment of Trustees'Duties and Liabilities
1. Fall of the R.A.P.
The evolutionary script followed by the statewide trend of abolishing the
rule against perpetuities involved lawyers, bankers and their professional
associations pressing abolition on state legislatures."l 3 Once Delaware
abolished its version of the rule, an inter-state jurisdictional contest dynamic
developed: each state rushed to abolish its version of the rule or extend its
perpetuity period to hundreds of years, worried that if it remained less
perpetuity-friendly than other states, its resident service providers and financial
institutions would incur a trust fund drain.
While regarding the reform of trust investment and trustee delegation law-
the NCCUSL and ALI were among the principal generators of change-the
NCCUSL has adopted a conservative position regarding perpetuities reform,
urging that the rule be retained, if in a simplified form.
In general terms, the Restatement [(Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers, adopted by the ALI at its 2010 annual meeting] provides
that a trust or other donative disposition of property is subject to judicial
modification to the extent that it does not terminate on or before the expiration
of the perpetuity period. The perpetuity period expires at the death of the last
living measuring life, defined as a group composed of the transferor and the
beneficiaries of the disposition who are no more than two generations younger
than the transferor. 114
ll 2 See Langbein, Nondelegation Rule, supra note 17, at 118-19; Langbein, Uniform
Prudent Investor Act, supra note 17, at 650-54; Langbein & Posner, supra note 17, at 18-
24. 1 13 See Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 19, at 2097-98.
'14Lawrence W. Waggoner, Curtailing Dead-Hand Control: The American Law
Institute Declares the Perpetual-Trust Movement Ill Advised I n. 1 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 199, 2010) [hereinafter
Waggoner, Curtailing Dead-Hand Control], available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=1614934; Lawrence W. Waggoner, The American Law Institute Proposes a
New Approach to Perpetuities: Limiting the Dead Hand to Two Younger Generations (Univ.
Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 200, 2010)
[hereinafter Waggoner, American Law Institute], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1614936.
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2. Rise ofAsset Protection Trusts
The appearance of asset protection trusts since the 1980s followed an
evolutionary script similar to that followed by the abolition of the rule against
perpetuities. Two differences claim our attention. One is that in the case of asset
protection trusts, it was foreign jurisdictions which ignited the jurisdictional
contest.115 Foreign jurisdictions did not play a similar role regarding abolition
of the rule against perpetuities. The other is that the spreading of asset
protection trusts is a much slower process than that of perpetual trusts. The
inter-state contest over the latter having started with Delaware's 1995 statutory
amendment abolishing the traditional rule, more than half the states have by
2013 either abolished it or extended their perpetuity periods to several hundred
years.116 While the inter-state contest regarding asset protection trusts started
two years later, with their 1997 recognition by Alaska and Delaware, these
trusts have by 2013 been recognized by only fourteen states. 117
3. Curtailment of Trustee Duties and Liabilities
The law of trustees' duties and liabilities has for the last twenty years
followed a clear trajectory: jurisdiction after jurisdiction enacted legislation
defining a core of duties, liability for infringing which cannot be excluded. Such
legislation effectively approved trust service providers' exculpatory clauses so
long as they left trustees' liability for infringing core duties intact. The resulting
inter-jurisdictional contest reflects the influence of trust service providers-
lawyers, bankers, accountants and other trustees-on legislatures, judges and
law commissions. One case in point is statutes enacted since 1990 by most
states, providing that, contrary to prior law, "trustee investments in vehicles
owned by the trustee or a related company do not give rise to a breach of the
duty of loyalty."" 8 As Leslie noted, "[i]t is difficult to attribute this sea change
in the law to anything other than effective lobbying by banks."ll 9
C. From Client Demand, Through Drafting, to Legislation: Curtailment
of Beneficiaries'Rights
The evolutionary script followed by the erosion of beneficiaries' rights
against their trustees started with many settlors' distrust of their beneficiaries
and desire to monitor their trustees themselves. Settlors are often uneasy with
1 5 See supra text accompanying note 68.
116 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
117 Domestic Asset Protection Trust Statutes are still being enacted. Virginia's statute
became effective July 1, 2012. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-745.1-745.2 (2012). Ohio's
became effective on March 27, 2013. See Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 5816 (LexisNexis 2012).
l8 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 20, at 116-17 (noting that UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 802(f) reflects these statutes).
119 Leslie, Common Law, supra note 20, at 2734; see also id. at 2720-34 (discussion).
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giving away their property to trustees. In the frequent cases where beneficiaries
are minors, unborn, incompetent, or otherwise seen, rightly or not, as unreliable,
settlors find little solace in that according to the traditional trust model, the key
persons able to control trustees' execution of their office are beneficiaries.
Settlor apprehension of trustees being controlled by such beneficiaries gave
birth to the trust protector, an additional trust officer, empowered to monitor
and control trustees. Settlors often appoint themselves, or a confidante, as
protectors of their trusts. 120 Protectors and non-beneficiary enforcers having
first been made available by way of drafting, both domestic legislation
curtailing beneficiaries' rights to information about the trust and legislation
such as the Cayman Islands' "Alternative Regime" are products of trust service
providers having lobbied legislatures to provide statutory products responding
to these common settlor worries. Non-beneficiary enforcers are, again, often
settlors themselves or their confidantes. Trust service providers' need for new
clients is thus changing the trust concept, modifying it so as to respond to
apprehensions the traditional model raises in potential settlors.
D. A Preference for Systemic Coherence: Letting Go of Equity and the
Trustee Ownership Requirement
1. Trusts Without Equity
The adoption of "trusts without equity" by civilian and "mixed" legal
systems was largely a result of local legal professionals' preference for systemic
coherence. Their systems being committed to the civilian ideal of indivisible
ownership, they sought to receive the trust into their systems without disturbing
this fundamental commitment. The drafters of the Louisiana Trust Code omitted
equity and beneficiaries' rights in the trust assets from their Code in order to
"give Louisiana citizens a sound, reasonable and flexible basis for the creation
of trusts within the ambit of the civil law, and expressed in civil law
terminology." 121 The Scots law of trusts grew out of Scots legal practice after
the 1603 union of the English and Scottish Crowns.122 Once the Scottish courts
and Institutional writers had to fit the trust in their civilian system of private
law, they omitted equity and the split ownership trust model for the sake of
120 On protectors see, for example, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64(2) cmt. d and
reporter's notes to cmts. b-d (2003); id § 75 (2007); id § 94 cmt. d(1) & reporter's notes
(2012); PANICO, supra note 77, at 405-45; Robert Ham, Emily Campbell, Michael Tennet &
Jonathan Hilliard, Protectors, in THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST, supra note 105, at 193-209;
Donovan W.M. Waters, The Protector: New Wine in Old Bottles?, in TRENDS IN
CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 63, 63-122 (A.J. Oakley ed., 1996). See generally ANDREW
HOLDEN, TRUST PROTECTORS (David Brownbill ed., 2011).
121 11 LEONARD OPPENHEIM & SIDNEY PUGH INGRAM, LOUISIANA CiviL LAW TREATISE:
TRUSTS 38 (1977).122 See Gretton, Scotland, supra note 97, at 518-22.
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systemic coherence. 123 The British colonial officials who drafted the Indian
Trusts Act of 1882 stated their desire to keep the Indian law of trusts "free from
the complication of double estates in which it is becoming entangled," 24 and
those who later adapted the Indian Act to form the Ceylon Trusts Ordinance
adopted the same solution.125 Exceptionally, the South African courts rejected
the split ownership trust model so that it did not disturb an unrelated policy,
their land registration system.126 The civilian and "mixed" legal systems which
have more recently adopted "trusts without equity" followed Scotland and
Louisiana in choosing this form of trust because it better coheres with the
undivided ownership principle they champion.127 The insertion of the trust, in
any form, into the legal systems of France and several Latin American
jurisdictions seems to have been a result of a global jurisdictional contest, with
bankers and lawyers in each jurisdiction fearing the loss of business unless their
jurisdiction adopt some form of trust. 128 Those jurisdictions' choice of "trusts
without equity," however, resulted from legal professionals' preference for
systemic coherence.
2. Elimination ofRequirement that Trustees Own the Trust Assets
Finally, the Chinese and Israeli "shapeless" trust regimes, as well as the
Qu6bec, Uruguay and future Czech trust regimes, are all products of recent
statutory efforts, undertaken in full view of the traditional common law trust
model and reflecting a conscious decision to deviate therefrom by not requiring
that title in the trust assets be allocated to any one point of the trust triangle.
One reason the Chinese chose a "shapeless" model was apparently a belief that
the Chinese population shall make more use of the jurisdiction's new trust
regime should trust creation be possible absent a transfer of title away from the
settlor. 129 As one purpose of the Chinese Trust Act was supplying China's
sometimes unstable trust and investment companies and other Chinese
investment funds with a stricter regulatory framework, this belief was,
12 3 See id. at 510.
124 See COORAY, supra note 100, at 29 (quoting Indian Law Comm'n, Report, in
GAZETTE OF INDIA [1880] Supp. 104).
125 See COoRAY, supra note 100, at 28-29.
126 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., Ho, Trust Laws in China: History, supra note 105, at 207-08, 219-21
(China); MALUMIAN, supra note 102, at 19-27 (Latin America).
128 See, e.g., Barribre, supra note 102, at 223 (France).
129 See Ho, Trust Laws in China: History, supra note 105, at 201 n.49. For "[t]he shaky
finances of Chinese trusts" during the late 1990s see China Ready To Shut 5 Investment
Trusts, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/03/business/china-
ready-to-shut-5-investment-trusts.html (reporting the Chinese government's intention to
"shut down five of the largest state investment trusts," and explaining that "[s]uch state-
owned trusts were created in the late 1980s to sustain free-market-style economic change.
But many became mired in debt after engaging in stock and real estate speculation; indeed,
many of the nation's 240 trusts are on the verge of bankruptcy, regulators say").
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according to Lusina Ho, "understandable"l 30: people are likelier to permit their
assets to be managed by organizations known to be unstable where such
management is possible absent the transfer of title in the assets to the manager.
Another reason for the Chinese choice not to require the transfer of trust assets
to trustees was a fear that given China's indivisible ownership model,
beneficiaries' rights may not be appropriately protected where title to the assets
was transferred to trustees. 131 Israel chose a "shapeless" trust model so that its
trust regime fit its trust practice, which having predated the formal introduction
of a trust regime, grew a broad, vague view of the trust, understanding the term
to encompass any fiduciary situation involving property.132 The Qubbec fiducie
is the result of a decades-long scholarly controversy focusing on the difficulty
of fitting the trust into a civilian legal system loyal to the undivided ownership
principle.133 The Uruguayan and Czech trust models appear to be simple
transplants of the solution found in Qu6bec. The two predominant motives
which drove the adoption of the trust models discussed in this Section were a
desire for systemic coherence and a wish that the local population use the
regime adopted. Compare the aspiration of, for example, those domestic and
offshore jurisdictions that permit self-settled spendthrift trusts, that clients from
outside the jurisdiction use the new trust forms.134
IV. DISTRIBUTIVE RESULTS
In this Part, I analyze the distributive consequences of the eight trust law
reforms described in Part II, grouping them according to their impact on parties
to trust relationships, on non-parties affected by trusts and, where relevant, on
the general population and overall economy. Parties to trust relationships
include settlors, trustees, beneficiaries, protectors, enforcers and some others.
Non-parties affected by trusts include trustee delegates, as well as the trustee's
trust creditors and key trust actors' non-trust creditors, including non-kin
creditors by contract, tort, unjust enrichment and other law (such as tax and
other authorities), and heirs, spouses, cohabitants, former spouses and
cohabitants, and children. This varied cast of actors can be fruitfully divided
into trust service providers, their clients, whom I call "trust users," and third (or
non-) parties, with a further distinction between savvy, sophisticated or well-
advised clients (who may be made settlors, trustees, beneficiaries, protectors,
enforcers or some combination of these roles) and less sophisticated purchasers
of mass-market trust services.
130 See Ho, Trust Laws in China: History, supra note 105, at 187-91, 202.
13 1 See id. at 201.
132 For the genesis of the Israeli trust regime see Adam Hofri, Shapeless Trusts and
Settlor Title Retention: An Asian Morality Play, 58 LoY. L. REv. 135, 149-59 (2012).
133 See the literature cited in WATERS ET AL., supra note 79, at 1413 n.26.
134 See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
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A. Reforms Enriching Trust Users and Service Providers at Non-parties'
Expense
Two of the trust reforms discussed in Parts II and III-abolition of the rule
against perpetuities and the rise of asset protection trusts-benefit trust users,
both settlors and beneficiaries, as well as trust service providers, by shifting
burdens to trust non-parties: trust and non-trust creditors, taxpayers and the
general population.
Some of the empirical consequences of R.A.P. abolition were identified by
Sitkoff and Schanzenbach, who found that "through 2003, roughly $100 billion
in trust funds have poured into the states that have validated perpetual trusts.
Assuming the applicability of typical industry commission schedules, these
funds are worth perhaps as much as $1 billion in yearly trustees'
commissions."1 35 The capital flow to perpetuity-friendly states has doubtlessly
continued since 2003. Analytically, the rise of perpetual trusts appears to serve
all three of the immediate parties to the trust-settlors, trustees and
beneficiaries-well. Settlors enjoy the prospect of defining and controlling the
allocation of their property between beneficiaries, and perhaps the use those
beneficiaries will be able to make of that property, for a much longer time than
hitherto. They further enjoy the exempting of at least some of their property
from federal transfer taxes for a much longer time than is possible absent
perpetual trusts. Trustees enjoy the prospect of drawing trust management fees
for an unlimited period of time and the end of the nontrivial potential for
professional malpractice litigation consequent on the traditional rule's
complexity. Beneficiaries enjoy the potential for receiving gifts settled on trust
by long-deceased settlors, the tax-saving advantages of perpetual trusts, and a
great prolongation of their enjoyment of spendthrift trusts settled in their favor.
The further removed one is from the trust core of settlor, trustee and
beneficiary, the less advantageous perpetual trusts appear. If perpetual trusts
stay available for long enough, the number of spendthrift trust beneficiaries is
likely to grow, to the detriment of their creditors-a group including their
current and former spouses and cohabitees, their children, and anyone to whom
they owe a debt, including tort creditors. From the point of view of society at
large, perpetual trusts have grave disadvantages. Not only does the prolongation
of spendthrift trusts into the indefinite future enable the perpetual peppering of
society with uncompensated harm, but, as Lau observed, a settlor's plan for
allocating his or her property several centuries into the future may eventually
allocate that property in a suboptimal manner. 136 Further, the tax planning
advantages of perpetual trusts from the point of view of trust users imply
disadvantages for trust non-users, who will have to either bear a greater tax
burden, live with a lower standard of government services, or both. Perpetual
trusts are also likely to contribute to the preservation of the current distribution
135 Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 18, at 410-11.
136 See M. W. LAU, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRUSTS 171-72 (2011).
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of society into classes, increasing the likelihood that the descendants of today's
wealthy class will be members of the wealthy class of a hundred or two hundred
years hence. In sum, perpetual trusts increase the externalities consequent on
trust use. They exacerbate socio-economic inequality. Given these
disadvantages, the income that trust service providers earn by providing
perpetual trusts is, from the point of view of social welfare, money spent
suboptimally. 137
Much like perpetual trusts, asset protection trusts transfer wealth from the
settlor-cum-beneficiary's creditors to him or herself and his or her trust service
providers. They also harm borrowers as a whole, since by increasing the
proportion of bad debts, they make credit more expensive. It may be that the
slower spreading of asset protection trusts among the states is a consequence of
their more obvious nature as an anti-creditor measure, while abolition of the
rule against perpetuities helps trust parties avoid both their creditors and the tax
authorities. Tax planning enjoys more popular and political legitimacy than
evading the claims of non-tax creditors, including spouses, children and tort
creditors.'3 8 Yet analytically, the impact of perpetual trusts and asset protection
trusts on trust parties and non-parties is similar: both reforms concentrate wealth
and control over assets in the hands of trust parties, and make possible trust
parties' infliction of more externalities than before on trust non-parties and the
public.
B. Reforms Empowering Settlors at Beneficiaries'Expense
The curtailment of beneficiaries' traditional rights to information and to
enforce the trust redistributes power between the immediate parties to a trust:
from beneficiaries to settlors. Settlors, traditionally powerless once a trust has
been constituted, are given ongoing monitoring and enforcement powers by
appointing either themselves or a confidante as protectors or enforcers.
Beneficiaries are greatly weakened by the removal of their traditional
monitoring and enforcement powers. As for the quality of trustee monitoring
provided, while the financially astute settlor of an inter vivos trust may monitor
his or her trustee more effectively than the feckless beneficiary of the same
trust, the removal of beneficiaries' monitoring powers may become more
problematic once the settlor is dead.
137 For discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of perpetual trusts see, for
example, Bridget J. Crawford, Who Is Afraid ofPerpetual Trusts?, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 79 (2012), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/1 10/Crawford.pdf;
Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor's Intent, 53 KAN. L. REv. 595, 613-20
(2005); Waggoner, Curtailing Dead-Hand Control, supra note 114, at 4-9; L. W.
Waggoner, U.S. Perpetual Trusts, 127 L.Q.R. 423, 425 (2011).
138 Though asset protection trust statutes often except creditors with maintenance or
child support judgments, spouses looking for property division, and (less frequently) tort
creditors, from the trusts' protection. See AM. COLL. OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL, supra
note 70.
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C. Reforms Enriching Trust Service Providers at Trust Users' Expense
Two other reforms discussed in Parts II and III-the liberalization of trustee
delegation and the curtailment of trustees' duties and liabilities-transfer wealth
from trust users, particularly beneficiaries, to trust service providers, including
both trustees and their delegates.
One distributive consequence of trustee delegation reform has drawn
adverse academic comment. Whereas under traditional law, a trustee who
delegated was usually liable to the beneficiaries for loss caused by its agent, the
reformed law makes clear that where the trustee delegated properly, chose an
appropriate agent and monitored it correctly, the delegate will be solely liable
for loss it caused.139 Should the delegate be insolvent, the reformed rule lays the
loss at the beneficiaries' door. Trustee delegation reform thus shifted some risk
from trustees to beneficiaries. 140 Reform also harms beneficiaries, and all other
non-service providers looking to collect from either trust funds or beneficiaries'
non-trust assets, by rendering trustees' employment of agents easier and more
acceptable, thus multiplying agents, agency costs and agents' fees.141 The
principal effect of trustee delegation reform is thus transferring wealth from
trust users to the service providers serving them. While trustees' power to
delegate discretionary functions, acquired as a result of that reform, may be
thought ex ante to provide trust users with access to a more complete expertise,
the availability, before reform, of opt-outs from the no delegation rule and of de
facto delegation means that improvement is likely to be limited to potential
savings of negligible transaction costs incurred earlier.
The eclipse of trustee duties and liabilities has transferred the risk of loss by
trustee negligence from trustees to trust funds and the beneficiaries entitled to
them. This risk reallocation negatively impacts trust creditors, as well as all
parties dependent on beneficiaries, such as their creditors, spouses and children.
It benefits trustees, particularly professional trustees such as bank trust
departments, which tend, more than lay trustees, to be regular users of
139 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80 cmt. g (2007); UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR
ACT § 9(b)c) (1994); Langbein, Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 17, at 653.
140 See criticism of this consequence of trustee delegation reform in Leslie, Common
Law, supra note 20, at 2735-42 (holding that the reformed rule is appropriate for lay
trustees, while professional trustees should always be liable for loss caused by agents to
whom they delegated); Sterk, Rethinking, supra note 19, at 897-904 (commenting that the
reformed rule creates harmful incentives).
141 See UNw. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 (providing that "[t]he trustee must be alert to
protect the beneficiary from 'double dipping.' If, for example, the trustee's regular
compensation schedule presupposes that the trustee will conduct the investment management
function, it should ordinarily follow that the trustee will lower its fee when delegating the
investment function to an outside manager"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 88 cmt. c & reporter's note.
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exculpatory clauses.142 Legislation providing that trust creditors shall look to
the trust fund, rather than to the trustee's own property, for satisfying trust
debts, also transfers wealth from the beneficiaries entitled to that fund to their
trustees. The larger trend that legislation is a part of the gradual "entification" of
the trust under American law, serves service providers' interests by limiting
liability for trust debts to the trust fund. That many jurisdictions' current law of
trustee exculpatory clauses expresses trust industry positions, serving the
interests of trust service providers, is underlined by the belief of many trust
scholars that the current law is too permissive.143
Several readers of this Articlel44 doubted whether the decline of trustee
liability transfers value from trust users to trust service providers. Surely, they
suggested, trust users would react to that decline by reducing trustee fees,
returning the market for trustee services to equilibrium. It appears doubtful,
however, that most settlors possess, on settling their trusts, the level of legal and
commercial savvy expected by these readers. In the most important empirical
study of settlors' attitudes to trustee exculpatory clauses conducted so far,
Professor Alison Dunn found that
the vast majority of [English] settlors are not particularly interested in the issue
of trustee exemption clauses [the English term]. Settlors are primarily
concerned with achieving a specific goal, not the means by which that goal is
achieved, and so their concern with trustee exemption clauses is only
incidental.... [S]ettlors tend to accept trustee exemption clauses as part of the
package of the modern day trust, especially if they have received advice to this
effect. Moreover ... many settlors regard the choice of trustee as more
important than the presence of a trustee exemption clause; about a third
of... respondents thought that settlors include a trustee exemption clause in
trusts either in order to attract professional trustees or because the clause was
142For the different impact of the law governing exculpatory clauses on lay and
professional trustees see Leslie, Common Law, supra note 20, at 2742-52; Leslie, Trusting
Trustees, supra note 20, at 73-75.
143See Hilary Delaney, Trustee Exemption Clauses-Proposals for Regulation in
Ireland, 23 TR. L. INT'L 89 (2009); Alastair Hudson, The Regulation of Trustees, in
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY, EQUITY AND TRUSTS LAW 163, 173-74
(Martin Dixon & Gerwyn LL. H. Griffiths eds., 2007); Leslie, Common Law, supra note 20,
at 2752; Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 20, at 72; Luxton, supra note 73, at 69; James
Penner, Exemptions, in BREACH OF TRUST, supra note 78, at 253. Compare Langbein, Duty
of Loyalty, supra note 17, at 987-90 (Langbein's advocacy of the modification of trustees'
duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary into a duty to administer it
in the beneficiary's best interest, permitting trustees to draw benefit, beyond their fees, from
their administration), with Leslie, Response to Langbein, supra note 20, at 586 (Leslie's
response, arguing for the retention of the sole interest rule). See generally Christopher
Groves & Judith Ingham, Trustee Exemption Clauses: Who Are We Trying To Protect?,
PRIVATE CLIENT Bus., no. 6, 2003, at 404.
144 Ilan Benshalom, Hanoch Dagan, Yonatan Givati, Ariel Porat and Eyal Zamir.
2014] 561
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
requested by the trustee. .. . [I]n practice the issue of non-inclusion of trustee
exemption clauses rarely arises. 145
Unless American settlors have vastly different attitudes than the English
settlors Dunn studied, it appears that most settlors are unlikely to be sufficiently
aware of the implications of exculpatory clauses for the service they are
purchasing to demand a fee reduction as quid pro quo. The parties to the trust
deal, potential settlors and trustees, enter into negotiations under conditions of
asymmetrical information about the consequences of exculpatory clauses. Due
to settlor disinterest, non-comprehension, or both, they are likely to conclude
their negotiations without that asymmetry having been corrected. It is possible
that some unusually sophisticated or well-advised settlors may possess the
understanding of exculpatory clauses and their import necessary to drive them
to demand a fee reduction as quid pro quo for the insertion of such a clause.
However the routinization of trust practice and its spread to the middle claSSl 46
are likely to have made such settlors a minority, as Dunn's study of English
settlors demonstrates.
Unlike legislation allowing the exclusion of trustees' liability for negligence
generally, legislation permitting trustees to refrain from intervening in the
affairs of companies the shares of which they hold in trust, and retain those
shares, despite the existence of more propitious investment opportunities,
without becoming liable to beneficiaries or others for the potentially infelicitous
results of the management practices they have allowed to continue, serves both
trust service providers' interest in decreased liability and business owners'
interest in using trusts as succession mechanisms for control of the family firm.
The adaptation of the trust form to serve as such a mechanism creates an
additional niche market for trust services.
D. Reforms Without Clear Distributive Results
Finally, the reform of trust investment law, the rise of "trusts without
equity," and the emergence of trust regimes which do not require the transfer of
title in the trust assets to the trustee do not, at present, appear to have well-
14 5 See Trustee Exemption Clauses, A Consultation Paper TT 3.38-3.40 (The Law
Comm'n, Consultation Paper No. 171, 2002), available at http://lawcommission.justice.
gov.uk/docs/cpl 71 Trustee Exemption ClausesConsultation.pdf. Commissioned by the
Commission "to conduct research into the economic implications of trustee exemption
clauses and the potential consequences of regulation of such clauses," id. 3.4, Dunn mailed
questionnaires to sample groups of 2050 trustees and 400 legal advisers to trustees and
settlors. Id. 3.10, 3.15. She also conducted sixty-five interviews with respondents in both
groups. Id 3.18. Her findings on settlors' attitudes are derived from the responses of
trustees and legal advisors.
146 For the spread of trusts to the middle class, see the comment of Matthew Blattmachr
of the Alaska Trust Company that "[t]rusts have hit the mainstream." Scott Martin, Trust
Companies Struck Gold in December Setting Up $5 Million Estate Planning Trusts, TR.
ADVISOR (Jan. 6, 2013), http://thetrustadvisor.com/news/2012boom.
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defined distributive results. As for the reform of trust investment law, which
allowed the trustees of some trusts to hold assets seen, under the previous law,
as too risky to be held on trust, it both imposed additional risk on, and promised
potentially enhanced returns to, both trustees and beneficiaries. The
beneficiaries of trusts the circumstances of which permit, under the Prudent
Investor Rule, higher-risk investments, may now bear the risk, as well as enjoy
the potential rewards, of such investments. Increased investment in equities may
create a hedge against inflation. The effects of reform on trust and beneficiary
creditors reflect its effects on beneficiaries. Trustees have lost the earlier safe
haven of conservative investment choices; they may now be sued for having
failed to properly invest in riskier assets. 147 Where trustee fees are measured by
a given percentage of the trust fund, however, the potentially enhanced
appreciation now possible also bears the promise of enhanced fees. The effects
of reform on non-trustees concerned with trust administration-protectors,
enforcers and trustee delegates-reflect its effects on trustees, at least so long as
protectors and enforcers serve in a fiduciary rather than a personal capacity.148
Trust investment reform may also have a positive influence on overall social
welfare, by releasing trust monies for potential investment in asset classes
which could not, before reform, obtain the benefit of trust capital. Reform may
thus contribute to the allocation of wealth across asset classes and economic
activities more closely approximating the optimal such allocation.
Some empirical findings are now available respecting the consequences of
trust investment law reform. According to Iris Goodwin, large banks and
institutional trustees have, to 2010, baulked at realizing the more radical
implications of the prudent investor standard, sticking to relatively conservative
strategies.149 Robert Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach report, however, that
trusts in the states that adopted the new prudent-investor rule held more stock
(on the order of 1-4 percent depending on the year) at the expense of safe
investments.... Prior to the reform ... [s]tocks composed 41 percent of the
average reform state's detrended aggregate portfolio, and safe investments
averaged 39 percent. After the reform . .. [s]tocks accounted for 47 percent of
the average reform state's detrended aggregate portfolio, and safe investments
averaged 34 percent.1 50
Trust investment law adjusted to 1970s inflation late-just in time for the
crashes of 2000-2002 (dot-com) and 2007 (subprime leading to general
crisis).151 Sterk believes that the
147 See Sterk, Rethinking, supra note 19, at 885-89.
148 See discussion of fiduciary and non-fiduciary protectors in RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF
TRUSTS § 75 cmts. c-c(2), f, & reporter's note to cmts. b-f (2007); HOLDEN, supra note 120,
at 33-53.
149 See Iris J. Goodwin, How the Rich Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust Company To
Secure a Family Fortune, 40 SETON HALL L. REv. 467, 504-10 (2010).
150 Schanzenbach & Sitkoff. Reform. supra note 18, at 697.
151 See Sterk, Rethinking, supra note 19, at 867.
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shift to equity investments did not generate tangible benefits for trust
beneficiaries. The 2008-9 stock market decline was dramatic. But even over a
longer time horizon of ten years, equity investments have performed poorly:
both the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Standard & Poor's 500
Index . . . stood at lower levels in June 2009 than they did ten years earlier. In
other words, trust law's implementation of modem portfolio theory appears to
have left many trust beneficiaries worse off than if trust law had retained
traditional principles of trust investing. 152
Were stock market performance between 1999-2009 typical, one would be
justified in concluding that the reform of trust investment law was contrary to
beneficiaries' interests. There is no justification, however, for assuming that the
disappointing results of that decade will be replicated in decades to come.
As for trust regimes not involving the law/equity duality, they are prima
facie likely to increase social welfare, compared to trust regimes based on that
duality, which introduces unnecessary complexity into the law. While the
administration of law and equity by separate courts is largely a thing of the past
in the United States, 153 the substance of law and equity has remained at least
partly unfused. So long as our legal system distinguishes between legal and
equitable causes of action, rights, remedies and precedents, some overlaps,
inconsistencies and contradictions remain likely, especially given the common
law tradition's characteristic satisfaction with local coherence. 154 The adoption
of a trust regime not reliant on the law/equity duality permits a legal system to
include a form of trust without thereby making the achievement of a high
degree of coherence and consistency more difficult. It is unclear, however,
whether the introduction of a non-equity trust regime into a civilian or "mixed"
legal system increases social welfare, compared to the same legal system
anterior to the introduction of trusts. The addition of property holding on trust to
a system's repertoire of security provision techniques may lead to the
conclusion of some welfare-increasing transactions which would not have been
realized absent the trust institution. 155 But the adoption of a trust form less
familiar to local and other practitioners than even the traditional common law
form may increase uncertainty, pushing practitioners to prefer foreign trust
regimes to the local form.
152Id. at 855.
153 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 27, at 1080; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 912 (1987).
154 For this characteristic of the common law tradition see Gerald J. Postema, Classical
Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1, 5 (2003); see
also KAARLO TUORI, RATIO AND VOLUNTAS: THE TENSION BETWEEN REASON AND WILL IN
LAW 58, 63 (2011).
155 See Frangois Barribre, The Security Fiducie in French Law, in THE WORLDS OF THE
TRUST 101, 112 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013), for a discussion of the introduction of the French
"security trust" (fiducie-sfiret6).
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Analytically, permitting settlors to retain title in trust property while
appointing another as trustee, or grant title in trust property to (non-trustee)
beneficiaries, is likely to reduce the potential for trustees' abuse of their
fiduciary position, because non-owner trustees are likely to be less powerful
than owner trustees: non-owner trustees are likely to need the owner's
cooperation in conveying title to trust property. It is concurrently likely,
however, to make trustees' management of the trust assets less efficient and
abuse by settlors or beneficiaries, depending on the locus of title, more likely.
The likelihood of creditors mistakenly believing that trust property is the
trustee's individually, or that the trustee's individual property is trust property,
may be reduced where the trustee no longer has title in the trust assets, though
as the trustee will still manage the assets and control them, some potential for
such confusion may remain, depending on asset type, registration requirements
and the rights, less than title, given the trustee in, or respecting, each asset.
Where the settlor or a beneficiary holds title to the trust assets, mistaken beliefs
that trust property is the titleholder's individually, and vice versa, may appear or
increase. The balance of social welfare is thus far from clear, depending on the
likelihood and gravity of the various risks.156
Empirically, the consequences of abolishing the requirement that for a trust
to be constituted, settlors must transfer title in the trust assets to their trustees
have been various. In China, trust creation in practice almost always involves
transfer of title in the trust assets to trustees,157 while the Chinese People's
Courts held, in two much-discussed decisions applying the Trust Act, that
where settlors transferred assets to trustees in trust for the settlors themselves,
the settlor-beneficiaries remained, despite the transfer, substantial owners of the
assets, the trustee being a mere "titular owner."158 In Israel, the "shapeless"
statutory definition of the trust made local practitioners prefer using foreign
trust regimes for sophisticated family trusts, while the courts took thirty years to
conclude that the Israeli Trust Act permits title in the trust assets to be lodged in
either settlor, trustee or beneficiary.159 It thus appears that making dramatic
changes to foundational characteristics of the trust institution creates significant
156 For analysis of the pros and cons of not requiring transfer of title to trustees, see Ho,
Trust Laws in China: History, supra note 105, at 200-01; Kenneth G.C. Reid,
Conceptualising the Chinese Trust: Some Thoughts from Europe, in TowARDS A CHINESE
CIVIL CODE: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 209, 213-17 (Lei Chen & C.H.
(Remco) van Rhee eds., 2012); Hofri, supra note 132, at 140-43, 172-77.
I57 See Ho, Trust Laws in China: History, supra note 105, at 202.
158 Id. at 202-10 (describing Yanxin v. Huabao Trust and Beying Haidian).
159See Hofri, supra note 132, at 162-65 (practitioners); id. at 159-62 (courts).
According to senior Israeli trusts and estates practitioners Alon Kaplan and George
Rosenberg, they and their fellow practitioners have in the last few years been making more
use of the local Act than heretofore, having discovered the potential of its free-form
approach to the trust concept. Interviews with Alon Kaplan, Founding Partner, MMG
Kaplex, in Tel-Aviv, Israel (Jan. 10, 2010, May 11, 2011 & Aug. 7, 2012); E-mail from
George Rosenberg, Founding Partner, Rosenberg, Abramovich, Keren-Polak, Epelman, to
author (Sept. 19, 2012) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
2014] 565
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
uncertainty. Users and service providers may choose to follow the traditional
trust model rather than the more adventurous varieties made available by
legislatures, despite the latter having been made available on the assumption
that local users and service providers would find them more attractive, and
easier to understand and use, than traditional trusts. Or users and service
providers may prefer to avoid the local trust regime completely, preferring
tried-and-true alternatives abroad. It is only in Qu6bec, which had a better-
established trust practice anterior to legislating its innovative trust model than
either China or Israel had when enacting theirs, that the recent trust regime has
led to the enrichment and diversification of trust practice. 160
V. FROM EVOLUTIONARY SCRIPTS TO DISTRIBUTIVE RESULTS:
CORRELATION AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A. Evolutionary Scripts and Distributive Results Correlated
Some of the distributive results described in Part IV are, from a social
welfare point of view, highly undesirable. The abolition of the rule against
perpetuities and the rise of Asset Protection Trusts have created perpetual trusts
and APTs as fortresses of privilege, externalizing harm onto the part of society
which neither uses trusts nor administers them. Trustee delegation reform and
the curtailment of trustees' duties and liabilities transfer wealth from trust
beneficiaries, who often acquire their beneficiary status involuntarily, may be
unsophisticated and sometimes rely on the trust fund as their principal source of
support, to trust service providers, who have succeeded in refashioning the legal
form they employ so as to obtain an ever-larger, ever more sure income stream.
From a social welfare perspective, these trust reforms appear to be clear failures
of the law reform process, turning the trust into a less attractive legal institution,
inviting unscrupulous, welfare-reducing rent seeking.161 Undesirable reforms
already enacted will have to be corrected, if at all, by re-amending the law on
the same issues. 162 How may similar failures be prevented, in the trust field or
elsewhere, before further welfare-reducing rules are enacted into law?
My discussion, in Part III, of the evolutionary scripts which led to each
instance of law reform studied in this Article, together with the analysis of their
distributive results in Part IV, provide a clue. They expose a correlation
between the evolutionary script followed by each instance of law reform and its
160 See, for example, the breadth of trust practice evident in CLAXTON, supra note 108.
161 The rent seeking concept has been centrally developed by Gordon Tullock. See, e.g.,
5 GORDON TULLOCK, The Rent Seeking Society, in THE SELECTED WORKS OF GORDON
TULLOCK (Charles K. Rowley ed., 2005). For Tullock's distinction between efficient and
inefficient rent seeking, see id. at 63-66.
162 For one attempt at such re-amendment, see the NCCUSL's attempt to roll back the
perpetual trusts revolution by offering a modernized rule against perpetuities. See generally
Waggoner, American Law Institute, supra note 114; Waggoner, Curtailing Dead-Hand
Control, supra note 114.
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distributive results. That correlation, in turn, makes possible the identification of
certain legal evolutionary scripts as especially likely to produce welfare-
reducing law reforms. Law reforms promoted through these scripts should be
treated with particular caution.
The substance of Parts El and IV, and the resulting correlation, are
succinctly expressed in Table 1.
Table 1: Evolutionary Scripts and Distributive Results Correlated
Law Reform Episode Evolutionary Script Followed Distributive Results
Reform of Trust User and service provider Beneficiaries bear more risk
Investment Law dissatisfaction 4 drafted and may enjoy higher
opt-outs 4 uniform law return. Trustees lost
reform 4 state enactment investment safe havens.
Trusts hold more stock, and
suffered from recent bear
markets. Possibly some
optimization of trust capital
allocation
Trustee Delegation User and service provider Burden of agency costs
Reform dissatisfaction 4 drafted increased, and shifted from
opt-outs, fictional compliance trustee to beneficiary. More
+ uniform law reform 4 service providers earn fees
state enactment from each trust
Abolition of the Rule Jurisdictional contest Tax-saving and judgment
Against Perpetuities between U.S. states proofing advantages of
trusts amplified; trust non-
users harmed
Rise ofSelf-settled Jurisdictional contest Judgment proofing
Spendthrift Trusts between offshore advantages of trusts
jurisdictions and U.S. states amplified; trust non-users
harmed
Trusts Without Equity Doctrinal evolution, aiming Increased uncertainty;
at systemic coherence; hints otherwise unclear
of a jurisdictional contest
Elimination of Doctrinal evolution, aiming Increased uncertainty
Requirement that at systemic coherence
Trustees Own the
Trust Assets
Curtailment of Worldwide jurisdictional Risk of loss shifted from
Trustee Duties and contest; (regarding "trading trustees to beneficiaries,
Liabilities trusts" alone) client demand their creditors and
dependents
Curtailment of Client demand 4 drafted Stronger settlors, weaker
Beneficiaries 'Rights responses - service beneficiaries; some threat to




The evolutionary scripts and distributive results studied in this Article, and
expressed in Table 1, show that reforms which were first implemented in
drafted opt-outs from the traditional law, before being received into state
legislation, tend to increase the burden of agency costs, grant the service
providers involved additional discretion, and sometimes increase their fee take.
Reforms which developed and spread by way ofjurisdictional contests tend to
amplify the insider priming effect of the reformed legal institution, distributing
benefits to users and service providers and costs to the rest of society. The case
of exculpatory clauses is exceptional among reforms which evolved by way of
jurisdictional contest, in that service providers were able to monopolize the
benefit of the reform, harming users. The consequences of reforms developed
by way of considered, non-competitive, statutory doctrinal innovation, focused
on retaining systemic coherence, differ according to whether reform was
imposed on a set of well-established legal practices, or imposed in the process
of first receiving a legal institution into a given system. Where reforms of this
sort are imposed on well-established legal practices they can matter relatively
little in practice, so long as they do not make unavailable a remedy used earlier.
Where imposed on the initial reception of a legal institution, reforms shaping
the domestic form of that institution as doctrinally different from forms
commonly found in other systems can create uncertainty, result in frequent
amendment of the new regime163 and even impede the absorption of the new
domestic version of the institution into domestic practice, as domestic users and
service providers may choose the more familiar form of the institution offered
by foreign systems.
Using this correlation to re-examine the common identification of
jurisdictional contests as likely to lead to welfare-reducing equilibria, I find that
while jurisdictional contests do tend to lead to such equilibria, they are not
alone. Many elements of the rapid "stripping of the trust" have resulted in
regimes that appear, from a social welfare perspective, unattractive. The
liberalization of trustee delegation, for example, leads to the transfer of wealth
from trust users to trust service providers, as does the curtailment of trustee
duties and liabilities. Reforms propagated by way of jurisdictional contest are
unique not in their results being welfare-reducing, but in the specific groups of
winners (small) and losers (large) delineated: some, though not all, such reforms
tend to refashion the legal institution in question as an externalizing island,
privileging both users and service providers at the expense of non-users.
Reforms which first appeared as drafted opt-outs in individual trust instruments
also tend to have welfare-reducing results, though they transfer wealth between
the parties to a trust-from beneficiaries to trust service providers-rather than
from non-parties to all the trust parties. Doctrinally focused reforms created by
jurisdictional legislatures, official law reform organs and expert scholars absent
163 As with the French Fiducie, introduced in 2007 and amended in 2008, 2009 and
2010. See Barribre, supra note 155, at 115-16.
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the added propulsion of jurisdictional contests or existing drafting practices
paving the way for reform tend to have less damaging distributive results. The
costly consequences of such reforms are often limited to a protracted
uncertainty. Because they do not create a well-defined benefitted group, their
projected user populations tend to adopt them with far less enthusiasm than
those using reformed regimes which evolved by way of drafted opt-outs or
jurisdictional contests.
B. Normative Implications
I thus argue that two of the legal evolutionary scripts studied in this Article
appear especially likely to lead to welfare-reducing consequences: the adoption
as default law of arrangements earlier imposed as drafted opt-outs from the
existing law, and jurisdictional contests. Legislators should be wary of law
reform initiatives following either of these two scripts, and carefully examine
their distributive results before enactment.
That the adoption into law of arrangements earlier imposed as drafted opt-
outs would tend to produce undesirable distributive results is unsurprising. Opt-
outs are often inserted in governing instruments, such as contracts or trust
deeds, by the stronger, more sophisticated party to a deal. Stronger, more
sophisticated parties, such as service providers in their relationships with
clients, are often better informed than their adverse parties about both the
applicable law and the content of the instrument governing a relationship with a
specific client. Consequently, many opt-outs express and promote the interests
of stronger, more sophisticated parties. The default law out of which they opt
may well be a penalty default rule, intended to force stronger parties to openly
negotiate their way to alternatives they find preferable.164 As Dunn's research
on settlor attitudes to trustee exculpatory clauses has shown, however, stronger,
better-informed parties can often opt out of penalty defaults with their adverse
parties either unaware of the opt-out or believing it does not materially affect
their interests. 165 Opt-outs are thus themselves likely to express the preference
of stronger parties that they win the largest possible part of the benefits of a
relationship, while most of the costs are borne by weaker parties. It follows that
opt-outs are likely to reduce social welfare, and that so is the adoption of
positions opted into as default law. Similarly with many law reform initiatives
proposed as part of an inter-jurisdictional contest. Driven by service providers'
need for clients or jurisdictions' need for investment, revenue and jobs, the fear
164 See lan Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (penalty default rules); see also
Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory ofAltering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032
(2012); Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 589 (2006); Eric Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 557 (2006); Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 563 (2006).
165 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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of clients, investment, revenue or jobs escaping elsewhere may bring
legislatures to dramatically compromise protections afforded to deserving
interests, such as those of creditors or taxpayers. While some jurisdictions may
gain revenue or jobs from dismantling the protections traditional law offered
such interests, that gain imposes large externalities elsewhere. Legislators
should thus see proposed law reforms enacting into law arrangements earlier
opted into by service providers, as well as reforms proposed as part of an inter-
jurisdictional contest, as inherently suspicious, and carefully examine, before
enactment, their implications for social welfare.
VI. CONCLUSION
Trust law has spent the last quarter-century changing at an exhilarating
speed. Much, though not all, of the change consisted of the casting off of
traditional restrictions and requirements, a "stripping of the trust." Traditional
rules limiting trustees' investment practices and their delegation power were
liberalized; the rule against perpetuities and the ban on self-settled spendthrift
trusts were abolished; many jurisdictions adopted trust regimes without
adopting equity, some even abolishing the classical requirement that title in the
trust assets be transferred to the trustees; while both trustee duties and liabilities
and beneficiaries' rights were curtailed. Each jurisdiction adopted a different
selection of trust reforms.
My purpose with this Article was to identify the causes of the social
welfare-reducing changes recently made to trust law, and propose a means for
preventing further welfare-reducing law reforms, in trust law or in other fields.
To that end, I have analyzed both the legal evolutionary scripts followed by
eight recent trust law reforms and their distributive results. I found that most
aspects of the recent trust reforms reallocated costs and benefits so as to reduce
social welfare, and that most of these welfare-reducing reforms either enacted
into law positions earlier adopted by service providers in opting out of the then
default law, or were adopted as one move in an ongoing inter-jurisdictional
contest. Those reforms that evolved by way of jurisdictional contests were
rather more unique in having evolved as parts of competitive races than in the
bottom-bound direction of the race. They were also notable for spreading the
benefits of reform among both users of the reformed institution and service
providers supplying it, creating a clutch of privileged winners made of both
users and service providers while externalizing the cost of their winnings onto
the rest of society. Reforms that enacted into law service providers' earlier opt-
outs transferred wealth from users to service providers. I concluded that
legislatures should examine proposed reforms originating either in service
provider-initiated opt-outs from earlier law or in jurisdictional contests with
great care, identifying their likely consequences for overall social welfare.
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